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I. INTRODUCTION
HE restructuring of the natural gas markets in the 1980s and 1990s
has fundamentally changed the way the natural gas industry con-
ducts business. This structural change, in turn, has reignited old
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disputes between lessors and lessees over which revenues that lessees re-
ceive are subject to the royalty obligation.
From its beginnings in the 1930s until the mid-1980s, the United States
natural gas industry was linear in structure.1 Producers extracted natural
gas and sold it to pipelines at the wellhead or in the field under long-term
contracts that obligated the pipeline to take or pay for minimum quanti-
ties of production.2 Pipelines bought gas from producers and sold it to
local distribution companies, state-regulated public utilities that supply
gas at the burner-tip, using minimum commodity bill tariffs to shift the
risk of their take-or-pay obligations to producers. 3 Local distribution
companies retailed gas to end-users.
4
The linear structure of the gas industry was transformed into a crazy-
quilt pattern abruptly in the mid-1980s, however, when a rapid decline in
demand for natural gas5 galvanized the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
1. My favorite historical treatment is Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural
Gas Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L.J. 1 (1988). See also Judith M.
Matlock, Overview of Federal Regulation, in OIL AND NATURAL GAS PIPELINES: WELL-
HEAD TO END USER 2A (1995 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND.); Vanessa A. Richelle, Com-
ment, Reworking Relationships in the Natural Gas Industry: Exploring the New Spot
Market and Its Operation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 655 (1994).
2. A take-or-pay clause, as such provisions are called, typically obligates a purchaser
to pay for a percentage of the gas the producer can produce, whether or not the purchaser
actually takes it. The provision compensates a seller for long- term dedication of a particu-
lar gas supply to a particular purchaser. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS,
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 1099 (9th ed. 1994).
3. Tariff minimum commodity bill provisions required local distribution companies
(LDCs) to pay for minimum amounts of gas even when their customers did not use that
much gas. 8 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 640
(1995). Minimum bill provisions were designed to compensate pipelines for contracting
with producers for reserves to meet the demand of LDCs and their customers.
4. The linear structure of the gas industry resulted from the federal regulatory
scheme. The Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z (1994), applied public utility
regulation principles to interstate natural gas pipelines, restricting entry to the industry,
regulating rates, imposing service obligations, and dedicating facilities. Generally, neither
producers, which were regulated by conservation agencies, nor LDCs, which were regu-
lated by state public utility boards, wished to subject themselves to an additional level of
federal regulation. In addition, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 79-79z-6 (1994), imposed an onerous regulatory regime through the Securities Ex-
change Commission upon vertically integrated gas and electric companies that tended to
cause each of the elements of the gas industry to avoid acquiring ownership interests in the
others. See ARLON R. TUSSING & CONNIE C. BARLOW, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY:
EVOLUTION, STRUCTURE, AND ECONOMICS 191-225 (1984); Ralph K. Huitt, Natural Gas
Regulation Under the Holding Company Act, 19 LAW & COrEMP. PROBS. 455 (1954).
5. Demand for natural gas in the United States peaked in 1971, when consumption
was approximately 22 trillion cubic feet (TCF). By 1979, total consumption had declined
to slightly more than 20 TCF. From 1979 to 1983, however, demand dropped a further
15%, from 20 TCF to 17 TCF. The following statistics, summarize the decline:
(Natural Gas Consumption in Trillions of Cubic Feet)
Electric
Year Residential Commercial Industrial Utilities Other
1979 5.0 2.8 6.8 3.2 2.2
1983 4.5 2.5 5.5 3.0 1.5
ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO. & CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH ASSoCS., NATURAL GAS
TRENDS (1988-89). The precipitous decline was largely due to three factors: conservation,
economic structural changes that required less energy, and fuel switching from gas to other
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mission (FERC) to restructure the industry to promote competition.6
Within a few years, the gas industry had become a highly competitive set
of markets in which pipeline companies are open-access transporters,7
rather than merchants, 8 and producers may sell in volatile "spot" mar-
kets, through brokers or aggregators, or even directly to large consum-
sources. In addition, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1994),
enacted on the premise that the United States was critically short of natural gas, actually
accelerated the decline in natural gas demand by triggering price escalation clauses in gas
contracts. Many of the Act's "maximum lawful prices," which were translated into actual
prices paid by the gas contracts of the 1970s, exceeded the market price of competing fuels
well before deregulation began in 1985.
Gas demand has now recovered to approximately the 1979 levels; natural gas demand
totaled approximately 21 TCF in 1994, Energy Consumption Hits All-Time High with Pro-
duction at Near-Record Levels, 23 ENERGY REP. (PASHA) No. 31, at 660 (Aug. 14, 1995)
(citing Energy Information Administration, ENERGY REv. 1994), and is expected to grow
to 22.5 TCF in 1995. API Stats on 1994 Cite 1st. Year Imports Exceed 50%, 23 ENERGY
REP. (PASHA) No. 1, at 59-60 (Jan. 23, 1995). The market forces that caused the precipi-
tous decline, however, remain. The conservation movement of the 1970s and 1980s (e.g.,
reinsulation and storm window installation) continues. The United States continues to
move from an industrial economy to a service economy. Fuel switching has become stan-
dard industrial practice. Nearly 20% of industrial boilers and process heaters-by far the
major component of industrial demand-have residual fuel oil backup, and another 44%
could be converted from gas to fuel oil. Marie L. Lihn, Loss of Industrial Market Share
Unlikely Without High Prices, 10 NAT. GAS, June 1994, at 21, 21.
6. Although the restructuring of the natural gas industry continues, its core is two
orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). In Order 380, Elimination
of Variable Costs from Certain Natural Gas Pipeline Minimum Commodity Bill Provisions,
49 Fed. Reg. 22,778 (1984), FERC permitted LDCs, the regulated public utilities that sup-
ply gas at the burner-tip, to avoid variable cost minimum bill provisions in their tariffs with
pipelines. Variable cost minimum bills varied with the level of service, with purchased gas
the primary component. Minimum bill provisions required LDCs to pay for minimum
amounts of gas even when their customers did not use the minimum amounts. In an im-
portant sense, minimum bill provisions balanced take-or-pay provisions in contracts be-
tween producers and pipelines. Thus, Order 380 left pipelines exposed to huge take-or-pay
liabilities to producers, but it also created a demand for short-term sales of natural gas,
which were at that time priced well below long-term sales. Order 380 was affirmed by
Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1114 (1986).
Having created a demand for short-term gas sales, FERC moved to the supply side of
the market. In 1985, FERC issued Order 436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After
Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985), which gave firm sales customers of
pipelines the right to reduce the amounts they were contractually obligated to purchase
and to convert their right to purchase to firm transportation rights. Order 436 also com-
bined carrots and sticks to encourage pipelines to abandon their traditional role of
merchant and become open-access transporters of natural gas. Order 436 was a deter-
mined attempt to transform interstate pipelines from merchants into transporters. It has
been largely successful. Virtually all interstate pipelines are now "open-access." Orders
380 and 436 are responsible for the development of the so-called "spot market," which
supplies 70 percent of current U.S. gas demand. Order 436 was affirmed in part and re-
manded for consideration in part in Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C.
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
7. Open-access transportation is common carriage, for all practical purposes. See
Paul E. Strohl, Gas into Gold- The New Alchemy of Financing Oil and Gas Acquisitions in
the 1990s, 39 RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 16.01, § 16.02[1], at 16-5 to 16-6 (1994).
8. In 1984, interstate pipeline gas carriage was 8.4% of throughput. By 1987, gas
carriage volumes exceeded pipeline sales volumes and comprised 55.6% of throughput.
NATuRAL GAS TRENDS, supra note 5, at 78.
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ers.9 In the old natural gas industry, lessees marketed gas by striking the
best deal they could with whatever pipelines had facilities near their
wells. 10 In the new natural gas industry, the marketing function has
evolved from responding to markets to creating them."
What has been called a "revolution" in the natural gas industry12 has
created a host of legal issues and has focused fresh attention on the roy-
alty obligation. Gas industry restructuring has unbundled and deregu-
lated packages of services that had been uniform and price regulated. As
a result, gas producers and royalty owners find themselves locked anew in
disputes over which producer-derived revenues are subject to the royalty
obligation. 1
3
A current issue that has attracted the avid attention of the mineral
bar-and to which the bulk of this Article will be devoted-is whether
royalty is due on take-or-pay payments,' 4 settlements,' 5 buy-outs, 16 and
buy-downs.' 7 Federal energy regulatory policy in the 1960s and 1970s en-
9. See WILLIAM D. WATSON, THE GAS SELLER'S COMPANION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO GAS CONTRACTS (1992); Robert A. Luettgen, Drafting Natural Gas Contracts After
Order 436: The Producer's Perspective, 1989 A.B.A. SEC. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY, &
ENVTL. L. (monograph series No. 11); John S. Lowe, A New Generation of Gas Contracts,
8 CORP. COUNS. REv. 1, 6 (1989).
10. Often, there was a single pipeline available. Usually, there were only a few.
11. Jay G. Martin, Summary of Significant Gas Market and Transportation Changes
Affecting Producers in the 1990's, 37 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 16.01 (1991) (an excel-
lent discussion of the development of the new natural gas marketplace).
12. STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, THE NATURAL GAS REVOLUTION OF 1985 (1985).
13. Royalty disputes have always been an element of the gas industry. See, e.g., Jac-
ques P. Adoue, Royalty and Pooling Provisions in Oil, Gas and Mineral Leases, 2 INST. ON
OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 195 (1951); Robert E. Hardwicke, Evolution of Casinghead Gas
Law, 8 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1929); Joseph T. Sneed, Comment, Value of Lessor's Share of
Production Where Gas Only is Produced, 25 TEX. L. REv. 641, 643 (1947).
14. The language of a gas contract take-or-pay clause is often quite simple. The fol-
lowing is excerpted from a gas contract from the Mid-Continent area (Oklahoma/Kansas)
entered into in the early 1980s:
Subject to all the other provisions of this Contract, Seller agrees to sell and
deliver and Pipeline agrees to purchase and receive, or pay for if made avail-
able hereunder but not taken, a daily contract quantity of gas, averaged over
each accounting period (contract quantity) during the term hereof, equal to
seventy-five percent (75%) of the maximum quantity of gas that Seller's
well/s can deliver to Pipeline....
Take-or-pay clauses usually permit the purchaser to make up gas paid for but not taken,
either on a volumetric basis (MMBtu for MMBtu paid for) or on a cash credit basis (take-
or-pay benefits paid are credited against the then-prevailing gas price when make up
occurs).
A take-or-pay clause guarantees the producer a minimum cash flow in return for dedi-
cating the gas supply to the purchaser. To economists, take-or-pay clauses provide for a
type of "demand charge," a charge for reserving an option to use, rather than a "commod-
ity charge," a charge for the quantity of the commodity used. Producers have historically
viewed take-or-pay clauses as a guarantee of a minimum cash flow and protection against
the risk that purchasers will "bank" contracted gas in the ground. Pipelines have seen
take-or-pay clauses as a non-price premium for gas commitment.
15. A take-or-pay settlement compromises a take-or-pay claim, usually for less than its
face amount, without changing the contract provisions.
16. A buy-out payment extinguishes a purchaser's obligation to take volumes in the
future under a contract being reformed or terminated.
17. A buy-down payment reduces the price of future production to the original pur-
chaser under an amended or successor contract.
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couraged consumption of natural gas by setting artificially low prices at
the wellhead, thereby discouraging exploration and development and
leading inevitably to supply shortages.' 8 The Natural Gas Act of 1938
and the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 effectively barred price competi-
tion. Therefore, some pipelines competed to meet what they perceived to
be huge long-term supply shortages by offering high take-or-pay percent-
ages to producers, who gladly accepted the offers as risk-shifting devices
that would protect them against demand fluctuations. Take-or-pay per-
centages increased from as low as twenty-five percent in the early 1970s
to as much as ninety percent at the height of the gas boom.' 9
When gas demand in the United States declined sharply in the early
1980s, the gas boom became a litigation boom as gas pipelines defaulted
on their take-or-pay obligations and asserted a variety of affirmative de-
fenses. 20 The take-or-pay problem was exacerbated in the mid-1980s by
FERC's industry restructuring, which sharply contracted pipeline sales
21
and created stiff competition in the pipelines' traditionally monopoly
markets. Many pipelines were confronted with take-or-pay liabilities that
were often larger than their net worths. The total potential liability of
pipelines was probably in the range of sixty to seventy billion dollars,
22
and settlement costs were probably in the range of twelve to fifteen bil-
lion dollars.
23
Royalty owners now claim that the royalty obligation attaches to the
settlements collected by producers. The take-or-pay royalty issue is just
one example, 24 however, of the broader problem of defining the revenues
18. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, 10 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 53, 54 (1995).
19. John S. Lowe, The Take-or-Pay Wars-Is Peace at Hand?, 8 OIL & GAS L. &
TAX'N REV. 3, 3 (1990).
20. The "take-or-pay wars" are chronicled in J. Michael Medina, A Report from the
Battle Zone: The Take Or Pay Wars, 58 OKLA. B.J. 2554 (1987), and J. Michael Medina,
The Take-Or-Pay Wars: A Further Status Report, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 381 (1988).
21. From 1984 to 1987, sales by interstate pipeline companies of natural gas declined
from approximately 11.75 TCF to 5.6 TCF, though total use of natural gas in the United
States declined only from approximately 17.9 TCF to 16.7 TCF. NATURAL GAS TRENDS,
supra note 5, at 38, 84-85. The sharp decline in sales by pipelines matched declines in gas
dedicated as a result of contracts terminated after renegotiation of take-or-pay disputes.
22. The costs of settlement were largely passed on to consumers. See John S. Lowe,
The Take-or-Pay Wars - Is Peace at Hand?, 8 OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N REV. 3, 3 (1990).
23. In mid-1989, interstate pipelines reported paying producers $8.8 billion in take-or-
pay settlements over the years. FACr SHEET ON TAKE-OR-PAY IN 1988: AN INTERIM RE-
PORT (1989). That same year, FERC summarized reports that it had received from pipe-
lines subject to its jurisdiction noting settlement costs through March 31, 1989 of $8.2
billion paid for past and future contract liability claims valued at $44 billion. Order 500-H,
54 Fed. Reg. 52,344, 52,356 (1989).
24. The problem of royalty on take-or-pay benefits has been well explored, nonethe-
less. See, e.g., Si M. Bondurant, Royalty Owner Rights Under Division Orders, 25 TULSA
L.J. 571 (1990); Cyril A. Fox, Jr., Rights of a Lessor in Payments Received by a Producer
from "Buydowns" or "Buyouts" of Long-Term Contracts, 10 E. MIN. L. INST. 1-1, § 1.02
(1989); James C.T. Hardwick & J. Kevin Hayes, Gas Royalty Issues Arising from Direct
Gas Marketing, 43 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 11-1, § 11.05 (1992); Bruce M. Kramer,
Royalty Obligations Under the Gun - The Effect of Take-or-Pay Clauses on the Duty to
Make Royalty Payments, 39 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 5-1, § 5.05[2] (1988); F. Henri
Lapeyre, Jr., The Rights of Royalty Owners to Share in Take-Or-Pay Payments or Settle-
1996]
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subject to the royalty obligation after industry restructuring.25 Other is-
sues include whether royalty is due on incentive payments to the lessee,
(e.g., gas inventory charges, 26 reservation fees,
27 and supply bonuses 28)
upon production payments to the lessee,29 or upon profits from invest-
ment devices such as hedges, trades, or swaps.30
The thesis of this Article is that the current controversy over whether
royalty is due on take-or-pay benefits is closely related to litigation of a
generation ago about the meaning of "market value." The principles de-
veloped in the market value litigation are likely to be applied to resolve
current royalty disputes, such as the issue of royalty on take-or-pay bene-
fits. The Article first examines the background of the royalty on take-or-
pay disputes, including the interpretative principles applied by the courts
in market value royalty cases. The Article traces the controversy over
royalty on take-or-pay benefits, analyzing the cases and their theories in
an attempt to rationalize the developing lines of precedent. After deter-
mining that the lines of cases are irreconcilable, it predicts the likely di-
ments, 38 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 18-1 (1992); John S. Lowe, Current Lease and Royalty
Problems in the Gas Industry, 23 TULSA L.J. 547 (1988); Richard C. Maxwell, Oil and Gas
Royalties - A Percentage of What?, 34 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 15-1 (1988); David E.
Pierce, Royalty Calculation in a Restructured Gas Market, 13 E. MIN. L. INST. 18-1, § 18.03
(1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lessor/Lessee Relations in a Turbulent Gas Market, 38 INST.
ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 8-1, § 8.03 (1987); Ernest E. Smith, Royalty Issues: Take-or-Pay
Claims and Division Orders, 24 TULSA L.J. 509 (1989); William H. White, The Right to
Recover Royalties on Natural Gas Take-or-Pay Settlements, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 663 (1988);
Arthur J. Wright & Carla J. Sharpe, Direct Gas Sales: Royalty Problems for the Producer,
46 OKLA. L. REV. 235 (1993); T.N. Leach, Note, Recent Development - Frey v. Amoco
Production Co.: Payment of Mineral Royalties on Take-Or-Pay Settlements in Louisiana, 67
TULSA L. REV. 840 (1993).
25. One commentator has suggested that an index-based royalty would solve the
problems caused by restructuring. David E. Pierce, Incorporating a Century of Oil and
Gas Jurisprudence Into the "Modern" Oil and Gas Lease, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 786, 815-33
(1994). Another has suggested that the royalty should be based on the price received by
the lessee while specifically providing for sales to affiliates and deduction of certain costs.
Thomas W. Lynch, The "Perfect" Oil and Gas Lease (An Oxymoron), 40 RocKy MN.
MIN. L. INST. 3-1, § 3.06 (1994).
26. A gas inventory charge (GIC) is collected by a supplier "'for standing ready to
supply gas to sales customers.'" American Gas Ass'n v. FERC, 888 F.2d 136, 144 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (quoting Order No. 500, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334, 30,346 (1987)). A GIC, like a take-
or-pay provision, is a demand charge. See Sheila S. Hollis, The Changing Framework of
Natural Gas Business and Law, 35 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 14-1, § 14.02, at 14-27
(1989).
27. A reservation fee is a demand charge collected for guaranteed or "firm" service.
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at 939.
28. A supply bonus is paid only if certain non-contractually-binding standards are met;
e.g., a gas purchaser may agree to pay a bonus to a producer who supplies more than a
stated amount over a stated period of time.
29. Enron Corporation has been particularly active in structuring production payment
transactions. Enron may lend money to a company to purchase or develop gas reserves.
Production from the field is then used to repay the loan. Alan Kovski, Enron Corp. Dis-
covers New Way to Finance Independent Producers, OIL DAILY, Jan. 28, 1994, at 1. For
discussion of the device, see Strohl, supra note 7, § 16.01.
30. For discussion of the modern generation of investment devices, see Mark E.
Haedicke, Contracts for the New Natural Gas Business, 13 ENERGY L.J. 313 (1992); Kath-
leen R. McLaurin, Trends in Natural Gas Contracts: Hedges, Swaps and Forward Sales, in
U. OF TEx. SCH. OF L., 19TH ANN. OIL, GAS & MIN. L. INST. § 5 (1993).
[Vol. 49
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rection of future case law and suggests limits to the logic of the case law.
The Article concludes by considering the implications of the royalty on
take-or-pay benefits cases for other disputes about the extent of the roy-
alty obligation.
This Article examines only whether the royalty clause of the typical oil
and gas lease includes take-or-pay benefits and some other benefits pro-
vided by the deregulated gas markets. This analysis does not examine the
related, but conceptually distinct, issues of what deductions may be made
in calculating royalty and the scope of the implied covenants to market or
to operate diligently and properly.
31
II. FUNDAMENTAL INTERPRETATIVE PRINCIPLES
Typical lease royalty clauses are simply too general to help define the
royalty obligation. Lease royalty clauses usually contain separate and es-
sentially different provisions for oil and for gas.32 Oil royalty clause pro-
visions commonly provide for royalty in kind and present relatively few
interpretative difficulties; royalty is "to be delivered at the wells or to the
31. In addition to the issue of which revenues are subject to royalty, gas industry re-
structuring has raised questions about what expenses the royalty must share. For example,
it is unclear whether the royalty must share all of the unbundled transportation costs a
producer may elect to utilize, including pipeline disciplinary charges such as gas imbalance
penalties incurred by the producer. Other examples of the uncertainty over expense-shar-
ing include whether various taxes are deductible proportionately from royalty and whether
the marketing expenses that lessees have traditionally borne but that are substantially
higher in the deregulated market may be passed through to royalty owners. The expense-
sharing issue, while related and parallel to the issue of which revenues are subject to the
royalty obligation, has been excluded from this discussion in an effort to keep this Article
reasonable in length.
32. The different royalty provisions for oil and gas stem from the physical and eco-
nomic differences between the two substances. The royalty share of oil can be temporarily
stored at or near the well and sold by the truckload. Natural gas, however, cannot be
stored economically and must be delivered into a pipeline. In addition, larger volumes of
gas usually command a premium; royalty in cash rather than in kind benefits both lessee
and lessor. JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 272 (3d ed. 1995).
The distinction between royalty in kind and royalty in cash may or may not be signifi-
cant. Where royalty is in kind, courts hold that the lessor retains legal title to the produc-
tion as personal property: "[tihe covenant with respect to delivery of the royalty oil has to
do with ... oil which the lessor already owns." 3 EUGENE KuNTz, OIL AND GAS § 39.2(b)
(1989). Where royalty is paid in cash, the lessee acquires title to production as it comes
from the ground. Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 61, 67 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957). Title to production is a significant factor in determining
whether the lessee can dispose of the royalty share without the lessor's approval and in
establishing the remedy available to royalty for nonpayment. Conversion may be available
to a lessor whose in-kind royalty right is ignored, while an action to recover an unsecured
debt is appropriate where cash royalty is not paid. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS
LAW § 659.1 (1993). Some courts have held that the form of royalty affects application of
tax statutes. Homestake Exploration Corp. v. Schoregge, 264 P. 388 (Mont. 1928) (stating
that lessor is not subject to net proceeds tax where royalty is payable in cash). Others,
however, have rejected such a distinction. Sheffield v. Hogg, 77 S.W.2d 1021, 1024 (Tex.
1934) (holding that both royalty in kind and royalty in cash are taxable as real estate be-
cause a stable oil industry requires that oil interests be treated as real estate).
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credit of Lessor into the pipe line to which the wells may be connected. '33
Gas royalty provisions usually provide for cash payments of royalty based
upon "market value at the well," "market price at the well," 34 or "amount
realized at the well."' 35 Gas royalty provisions, in particular, have always
prodigiously generated litigation because the royalty is generally due in
cash rather than in kind and because the sale that generates the cash
often occurs downstream from the well.
36
Black letter law states that the courts solve interpretative disputes in oil
and gas leases or conveyances, as in conveyances and contracts generally,
by applying hoary rules of judicial construction:
First, the court will attempt to ascertain intent by examining the lan-
guage ... in dispute.
When an instrument's substance is determined to be clear or un-
ambiguous, the parties' intent must be effectuated.
In cases in which an instrument is not so clear (e.g., different provi-
sions of the instrument seem inconsistent or contradictory), the court
will, if possible, harmonize the provisions in accord with the parties'
apparent intent.... If examination solely of the language within the
instrument's four corners does not yield a clear understanding of the
parties' intent, the court will generally proceed to ... discretionary
implementation of applicable "canons" of contract construction....
Application of "canons" of construction may provide a court with
an objective inference of the parties' intent. But if, at this step in the
process, intent remains unascertainable (i.e., the instrument is still
considered ambiguous), then the court may resort to a final tier in
the three-tiered process of construction. This final tier entails con-
sideration of extrinsic or parol evidence.37
33. EUGENE 0. KUNTZ ET AL., FORMS MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 11 (2d ed. 1993) (AAPL Form 675, Oil and Gas Lease, Texas
Form, Form # 3).
34. Market price is the price that is actually paid by buyers for the same com-
modity in the same market. It is not necessarily the same as "market value"
or "fair market value" or "reasonable worth." Price can only be proved by
actual transactions. Value or worth, which is often resorted to when there is
no market price provable, may be a matter of opinion.
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Coffee, 140 F.2d 409, 410-11 (5th Cir. 1944). But see Arkan-
sas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor, 78 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 656 (1935)
(where royalty is due on value calculated at the market price, value and price are inter-
changeable and refer to the average price in the field).
35. This is not an exhaustive list of the many variations of royalty formulations.
36. A key to understanding royalty disputes is to note that the lessor's royalty
is due at the well (where the product of development is captured) while oil
and gas - particularly gas - are often sold "downstream" from the well.
Where royalty is due to the lessor in kind, as is generally the case with oil
royalty, or where there is an arm's length sale at the well, there are few dis-
putes. Where royalty must be calculated, based upon a hypothetical "market
value" or upon a downstream sale price, however, disputes between lessors
and lessees are almost inevitable.
JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 272 (3d ed. 1995).




The first step in the interpretative process is frequently referred to as
the "four corners rule," because the courts look to the four corners of the
instrument to ascertain the parties' intent.38 But because certainty is a
bedrock principle, particularly in matters relating to real property owner-
ship, the courts seek objective evidence of intent in the terms of the
instrument.
39
If the four corners review yields no clear intent, the courts turn to rules
of construction. The canons of construction commonly used in the sec-
ond tier of the interpretative process 40 include the doctrines that the in-
strument be construed against the drafting party, 41 that handwritten or
typed language prevails over inconsistent printed language, 42 that the
granting clause prevails if there is an irreconcilable conflict among
clauses, 43 and that a specific description prevails over a general descrip-
tion. 4 There are many other such canons.
45
As a last resort, courts often examine extrinsic evidence of the circum-
stances surrounding the conveyance. They may consider parol (oral) evi-
38. "[W]hile the inquiry may not stop with the lease language, it nevertheless most
certainly must start" there. Klein v. Jones, No. 90-2060 (W.D. Ark. filed Jan. 5, 1994).
"[Tihe written instrument is presumed to embody their entire contract, and the court
should not read into the instrument additional provisions unless this be necessary in order
to effectuate the intention of the parties as disclosed by the contract as a whole." Danciger
Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell, 137 Tex. 484, 490, 154 S.W.2d 632, 635 (1941). The four corners
rule is itself a canon of construction. See Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Inter-
preting Mineral Deeds and Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEX.
TECH. L. REv. 1, 65-72 (1993).
39. The interpretative process for contracts is very much the same as for conveyances,
although somewhat less rigid. LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 210 (2d ed. 1965). See Cambridge Oil Co. v. Huggins, 765 S.W.2d 540 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
40. At this stage, the courts are no longer truly looking for the parties' intent. As
Professor Bruce Kramer points out:
"Canons of construction are merely statements of judicial preference for the
resolution of a particular problem. They are based on common human expe-
rience and are designed to achieve what the court believes to be the 'normal'
result for the problem under consideration. Thus, their purpose is not to
ascertain the intent of the parties to the transaction. Rather, it is to resolve a
dispute when it is otherwise impossible to ascertain the parties' intent."
When understood not to be a substitute for rational thought and common
sense, canons of construction are very useful and provide a degree of cer-
tainty to the conveyancing industry. However, when abused, the battle of
"canons" replaces rational thought and common sense and leads to obfusca-
tion and uncertainty.
Kramer, supra note 38, at 4-5 (quoting 6A RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY § 899[3], at 81A-108 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1992)).
41. With oil and gas leases, this rule normally results in a construction against the
lessee. In fact, the premise that the lease is always to be interpreted contrary to the lessee's
interests is sometimes asserted. See, e.g., Klein v. Jones, 980 F.2d 521, 531 (8th Cir. 1992)
(discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 127 to 134). For discussion of the canon,
see Kramer, supra note 38, at 103-17.
42. See Kramer, supra note 38, at 96-100.
43. Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984), overruled by Luckel v. White, 819
S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991). These cases are discussed in Kramer, supra note 38, at 57-58.
44. Kramer, supra note 38, at 90-95.




dence, the performance of the parties before the dispute, and letters,
memoranda, or records bearing upon the negotiations that led to the am-
biguous deed or lease.46
In addition, while the technique is not an accepted part of the general
interpretative process, a court may look beyond the words of oil and gas
leases to implied covenants. A court may consider promises implicit in
the factual circumstances of the lease or arising from the parties' legal
relationship, particularly if the court concludes the parties did not con-
template the situation that is the source of the dispute.
47
III. THE FAILURE OF PRINCIPLE
The three-tiered judicial construction of disputed language is not cer-
tain to lead to the parties' intent. The four corners rule often leads to
literal interpretations in which the result turns on the choice of a word or
phrase or the placement of a comma. The canons of construction are
often contradictory, so that choosing the applicable canon for the second
tier determines the outcome. The sheer number of rules of construction
and the lack of agreement as to which should be applied, and when, virtu-
ally guarantee confusion. Some canons of construction further policy
goals unrelated to intent. For example, the rule that an instrument will be
construed against the drafting party promotes certainty in title and care in
drafting but does not guide us to intent. Finally, extrinsic evidence is
likely to be either self-serving or inconclusive. At best, the three-step
process of judicial construction provides an objective, reasonable infer-
ence of the parties' intent. At worst, the process results in a fictional
intent unrelated to the reality of the transaction.
Litigation over the oil and gas lease royalty obligation shows the judi-
cial construction process at its worst. In the context of royalty litigation,
different courts have applied the same fundamental principles of judicial
construction differently and have reached disparate and confusing re-
sults.48 It appears the best we can hope for is that the various jurisdic-
tions will deal with the issue of royalty on take-or-pay benefits and other
benefits of the restructured market consistently with their treatment of
the "market value" royalty problem.
A. THE MARKET VALUE CASES
The market value royalty disputes are a good example of the failure of
the fundamental interpretative principles to lead to the parties' intent.
The courts have split on the meaning of "market value" or "market
46. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 717 (1984).
47. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 172 (La. 1992) ("To these basic concepts
[of lease interpretation], we add one other. In Louisiana, a mineral lease is interpreted so
as to give effect to the covenants implied in every such lease." (citation omitted)).
48. I have made a similar argument that the three-tiered judicial interpretation process
has confused the meaning of the term "minerals" in deeds. John S. Lowe, What Substances
are Minerals?, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 2-1, § 2.01 (1984); John S. Lowe, Develop-
ments in Non-Regulatory Oil and Gas Law, 32 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 117 (1981).
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price" in the lease royalty clause when the lessee sells natural gas at a
dedicated long-term contract price different from the current market
price, a common occurrence during the 1970s and 1980s, when a combina-
tion of market forces and government regulation caused new gas contract
prices to escalate faster than regulated long-term contract price adjust-
ments. The same issue was decided differently by courts applying the
same analytical process.
A majority of courts, interpreting the laws of Texas, 49 Kansas, 50 Mon-
tana,51 North Dakota,52 Mississippi,53 and West Virginia,54 ruled that
"market value" is the current market value when the gas is produced and
delivered, even though the gas is dedicated to a long-term contract at a
lower price. A minority of jurisdictions, including Oklahoma, 55 Louisi-
ana,56 and Arkansas, 57 held that "market value" is the dedicated contract
price, as long as the lessee entered into the contract prudently and in
good faith.
58
The essential difference between the two lines of market value royalty
cases is their application of the fundamental interpretative principles.
The majority view is that "market value" is a "plain term" that must be
given its usual meaning-the price a willing buyer and seller would agree
upon at the time of production.59 Interpreting a royalty clause that called
for royalty based upon the "market price at the wells," the court in Texas
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela60 made the classic statement of the analysis:
49. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Tex. 1981).
50. Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 P.2d 1, 11 (Kan.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876
(1977).
51. Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 586 P.2d 298, 302 (Mont. 1978).
52. West v. Alpar Resources, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 484, 487 (N.D. 1980).
53. Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 236 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985).
54. Imperial Colliery Co. v. OXY USA, Inc., 912 F.2d 696, 700 (4th Cir. 1990).
55. Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1273 (Okla. 1981).
56. Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334, 1339 (La. 1982).
57. Hillard v. Stephens, 637 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Ark. 1982).
58. Either approach has little or nothing to do with the original purpose of the royalty
clause. The drafters intended to make clear that when gas is not sold at the well, either
because there is no market for gas at the well or because there is a better market else-
where, the lessee will have the right to deduct the lessor's proportionate share of additional
costs involved to "work back" to the value of the gas at the wellhead. John S. Lowe,
Developments in Non-Regulatory Oil and Gas Law, 32 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N
117, 144-52 (1981).
59. Not surprisingly, not all of the market value royalty decisions fit neatly into this
analysis. In J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966), the course of the
parties' conduct, including a rejected contract draft with contrasting terms and statements
of counsel before the Federal Power Commission, provided ample justification "that the
literal terms... should be given their literal meaning." Id at 109. In Lightcap, 562 P.2d at
9, the court treated "market value" as ambiguous and applied "the well recognized doc-
trine that ambiguous instruments are to be construed strictly against their draftsmen." Id.
(citations omitted). More recently, the Fifth Circuit considered the function of the clause
in holding that Mississippi would adopt the market value rule: "Resort to grammatical
parsing is less instructive here than is a consideration of the purpose of the gas royalty
clause, taken as a whole." Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 230.
60. 429 S.W.2d. 866 (Tex. 1968).
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[The parties to the lease] might have agreed that the royalty on gas
produced from a gas well would be a fractional part of the amount
realized by the lessee from its sale. Instead of doing so, however,
they stipulated in plain terms that the lessee would pay one-eighth of
the market price at the well of all gas sold or used off the premises.
This clearly means the prevailing market price at the time of the sale
or use.
61
By this view, rules of construction or extrinsic evidence of special mean-
ing are unnecessary.
62
The minority view is that "market value" is either ambiguous or is a
term of art in the gas industry. Courts must therefore look beyond the
four corners of the lease to the parties' intent, to implied covenants, or to
fundamental fairness. Cases following this approach have concluded that
the "market value" of gas is the long-term contract price, even though
that price may be less than the current market price in a fair, arms-length
contract. The leading case in this line of reasoning is Tara Petroleum
Corp. v. Hughey.63 In Tara, the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered a
lease that provided for royalties based upon "market price at the well" 64
and determined:
[c]onceding that competent parties should be held to their agree-
ments even though improvident, the typical [royalty] clause . . .
seems to be freighted with inherent ambiguity when it is
remembered that gas must be sold by long term contracts in which
buyers have been able to obtain schedules of prices almost certain to
get out of line with contemporary contracts .... 65
The court relied upon the "well-known reality of the business" 66 that the
lessee has an implied covenant to market, the fundamental unfairness to
producers of royalties based on a price higher than the contract price, and
"the intent and understanding" 67 of the parties to the lease. The court
concluded that " 'the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the lessee
as a matter of law, with inquiry restricted to whether the sale was a rea-
sonable contract when made.' 68
61. Id. at 871 (emphasis added).
62. Most of the cases adopting the market value royalty rule used similar language to
describe their analysis. In Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1964), the
court treated as fixed and unambiguous a royalty provision calling for royalties based on
the "market price ... prevailing." In addressing a clause calling for "market value at the
well" royalties, the Texas Supreme Court used exactly the same language as that quoted
from Vela in the text accompanying note 61, supra. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d
240, 245 (Tex. 1981). The language from Vela was in turn quoted favorably in Holmes v.
Kewanee Oil Co., 664 P.2d 1335, 1339 (Kan. 1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 953 (1985), in
which the court applied the market value royalty rule. See also Imperial Colliery Co., 912
F.2d at 700 (declining to find that a division order changed the effect of a clear and unam-
biguous market value clause).
63. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
64. Id. at 1272.
65. Id. at 1273 (quoting 3A. W.L. SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 589 (2d. ed. William J.
Flittie Supp. 1980) at 22-23).
66. Id. at 1274.
67. Id.
68. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1274 (quoting SUMMERS, supra note 65, at 22-23).
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In Hillard v. Stephens,69 the Arkansas Supreme Court largely followed
the Tara reasoning. The court quoted extensively from the Tara court's
consideration of the "necessity of the market" that the lessee market
within a reasonable time at the best price available. 70 The court con-
cluded that the long-term contract price was the "prevailing market price
at the well" 71 because that result was "consistent with the intent and the
understanding of both" 72 lessor and lessee and "is the only interpretation
that operates fairly for the producer. '
73
A Louisiana case, Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp.,74 also treated
"market value" as ambiguous and concluded that the producer's long-
term contract price established "market value. ' 75 The Louisiana
Supreme Court rejected Vela and similar "plain terms" cases because
they gave "[t]he practical and economic necessities of the oil and gas in-
dustry at the time the leases were negotiated ... little or no considera-
tion."'76 Noting that "[tihe ambiguity in the language of the royalty
provisions arises from the failure of the parties to the lease to expressly
state whether 'market value' means current market value," 77 the court
reasoned that the royalty clause ambiguity must be resolved by consider-
ing the "necessary realities of the oil and gas industry" 78 and the "custom
of the industry. ' 79 Among the factors that the Louisiana court contended
should be considered in resolving the ambiguity was the nature of the oil
and gas lease as a "cooperative venture"80 between lessor and lessee in
which "the lessor contributes the land and the lessee the capital and ex-
pertise necessary to develop the minerals for the mutual benefit of both
parties"''s so that the parties " 'usually contemplate that the lessee will
dispose of the gas (in a prudent manner) and pay the lessor the fractional
part of the value which he is to enjoy from the enterprise.' ",82
The cooperative venture principle stated in Henry was an important, if
unstated, premise for Tara v. Hughey and Hillard v. Stephens. Both cases
were predicated upon an implied covenant to market, which imposed
upon the lessee the "necessity" of contracting at the market price avail-
able.8 3 According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the cooperative na-
69. 637 S.W.2d 581 (Ark. 1982).
70. Id. at 584 (quoting Tara, 630 P.2d at 1273).
71. Id. at 583.
72. Id. at 585.
73. Id.
74. 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982).
75. Id. at 1341.
76. Id. at 1338.
77. Id. at 1337.
78. Id. at 1339.
79. Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1340.
80. Id. at 1338.
81. Id. (citing Thomas A. Harrell, Developments in Non-Regulatory Oil & Gas Law,
30 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 311, 334 (1979)).
82. Id. (quoting Harrell, supra note 81, at 335).
83. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1273; Hillard, 637 S.W.2d at 584.
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ture of the lease gives rise to the implied covenant to market.8 4 Viewing
the lease as a cooperative venture supports the inference that the lessor
and lessee intended that "market value" or "market price" would be
based upon the long-term contract price where the lessee prudently en-
tered into a long-term contract.8 5 Thus, the cooperative venture rule may
be seen either as a harmonizing principle used in interpreting the four
corners of the lease, or as a specialized canon of construction that Ameri-
can courts have used to interpret ambiguous royalty clauses.
B. THE ROYALTY ON TAKE-OR-PAY CASES
The cases involving claims for royalty on take-or-pay benefits proceed
on the same premises as the market value cases from their jurisdictions.
They seem destined to leave the law and the industry even more split.
The two lines of cases begin with different premises that mirror those
applied in the market value cases. The premise of the cases holding that
"production" is the prerequisite for royalty so that royalty cannot be due
on a payment in lieu of production is that the lease is a closely negotiated
business transaction designed to apportion risk between the lessee and
the lessor. Therefore, the lease royalty clause expresses the "plain mean-
ing" of the parties and "production" or "sale" should be interpreted
strictly, just as was "market value." The theory of the countervailing line
of cases-fast becoming known as the "cooperative venture" theory86-
is that the lease royalty clause is not a closely bargained for provision that
defines the precise limits of the royalty obligation, but a statement of the
general expectations of both parties. A lessor, who owns mineral rights
but lacks the expertise and/or money to develop them, transfers the rights
84. "'From [the cooperative nature of the lease] arises the affirmative, although im-
plied obligation of the lessee to market .... ' " Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1338 (quoting Harrell,
supra note 81, at 334).
85. We have recognized this necessity of the market, and we believe that les-
sors and lessees know and consider it when they negotiate oil and gas
leases....
... We do not believe that the lessors ... ever contemplated that the
lessors' royalty could be [disproportionate to the royalty percentage of the
amount realized].
Tara, 630 P.2d at 1273 (quoted in Hillard, 37 S.W.2d at 584).
86. The precise terminology is not crucial to the analysis. For example, the coopera-
tive venture analysis is not substantially different from treating the oil and gas lease as a
relational contract, an agreement in which the parties are incapable of reducing important
terms of the agreement to well-defined obligations, perhaps because the problems that the
contract should address cannot be predicted accurately or because the parties are unable to
agree upon solutions to problems that may arise. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1981). Instead of attempting
to define the parameters of their agreement in a discrete contract, the parties to a rela-
tional contract agree to establish a relationship, with the explicit or implicit understanding
that the parties will use good faith to sort out unanticipated problems. Distributorships,
franchises and employment contracts are the classic examples of relational contracts, but
oil and gas leases have been described as relational contracts, as well. Charles J. Meyers &
Steven M. Crafton, The Covenant of Further Exploration - Thirty Years Later, 32 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1-1, § 1.04 at 1-19 (1986). See also MAURICE H. MERRILL, ThE LAW
RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § 220 (2d ed. 1940).
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to a lessee, who either possesses or implies that it can acquire what the
lessor lacks. If the lessee develops the mineral rights successfully, the
lessor expects to share proportionately in the benefits of the
development.
Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel87 is perhaps the most
cited case denying royalty on take-or-pay benefits. Interpreting a federal
off-shore lease calling for royalties of "162b% in amount or value of pro-
duction saved, removed, or sold from the leased area, 88 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals denied the federal government a royalty share of take-
or-pay payments made under a gas contract because the government's
claim did not:
comport with the plain meanings of the words in 'the lease, and in the
relevant statutes and regulations .... [R]oyalties are not due on
"value" or even "market value" in the abstract, but only on the value
of production saved, removed or sold from the leased property....
Consequently, royalties are not owed unless and until actual produc-
tion, the severance of minerals from the formation, occurs.89
The court reasoned that royalty is a payment for production, while
take-or-pay payments are paid in lieu of production.90 Take-or-pay pay-
ments are not for the gas sold, said the court, but rather for the failure to
purchase gas.91 The lessor does not "shoulder the ... risks of explora-
tion, production and development;" and so should not share in the take-
or-pay benefits. 92 Because the lease required royalty payments only on
the value of minerals actually produced, the court held that no royalty
was due on take-or-pay payments until the make-up gas was produced
and the payment recouped 93 Under such a lease, if the purchaser never
makes up the volumes paid for, "there is nothing to value either by mar-
ket or otherwise.
'94
Texas courts have followed similar reasoning. In Killam Oil Co. v.
Bruni,95 the lessor sought royalties on a take-or-pay settlement under a
lease drafted by the lessor that provided for "market value at the well"
royalties on "gas . .. produced from said land and sold or used off the
premises. '96 The Texas Court of Appeals in San Antonio denied recov-
ery because "the term 'production' ... means the actual physical extrac-
tion of the mineral from the soil."97 The court noted that the lessor, a
87. 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988).
88. Id. at 1161. The lease language tracks the provisions of 30 C.F.R. §§ 206.150 &
206.151 (1995).
89. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1165 (emphasis in original).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1167.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1168. Thus, the court distinguished between recoupable take-or-pay pay-
ments-those which entitle the gas purchaser to take gas at a later date-and non-
recoupable payments-those which do not entitle the purchaser to take gas later.
94. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1167.
95. 806 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
96. Id. at 266 (emphasis in original).
97. Id. at 267.
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trust, could have provided specifically for royalties on take-or-pay settle-
ments,98 but reasoned that by choosing the language of the royalty clause
"the Trust unambiguously limited its right to royalty payments only from
gas actually extracted from the land." 99 The court concluded by holding
that:
under a standard lease, take-or-pay payments do not constitute any
part of the price paid for produced gas, nor do they have the effect of
increasing the price paid for gas that was taken. These payments are
made when gas is not produced, and as such, bear no royalty.100
The same Texas court reaffirmed its reasoning upon similar facts in
Hurd Enterprises, Ltd. v. Bruni.l0 The lessors asked the court to recon-
sider its decision in Killam Oil02 in light of the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Frey v. Amoco Production Co.,103 which interpreted lease royalty provi-
sions that the lessor contended were substantially the same as those
before the Hurd court. The Hurd court distinguished the royalty provi-
sions in the two cases, noting that the federal court construed the Frey
royalty clause as being triggered by sales, rather than production (which
under Louisiana law might include a sale of future production), whereas
the royalty provision in Killam Oil was triggered only by actual produc-
tion. 1°4 "[U]nder Texas law, the term 'production' in oil and gas leases
means the actual physical extraction of the mineral from the soil.' ' 105 Be-
98. Of course, the lessor and lessee could have avoided the dispute had they dealt
specifically with take-or-pay payments in the lease. For example:
Lessee agrees to pay Lessor 3/16th royalty on any and all amounts received
by the lessee pursuant to take-or-pay clauses, contract buy-outs and contract
buy-downs and the Lessor shall have the same rights and remedies herein
provided for the payment of royalties.
KUNTZ ET AL, supra note 33 ("Exhibit A": Landowner's Attachment to Oil and Gas Lease
(by Robin Stead, Esq.), Form # 5).
Another example is paragraph 3(d) of a lease used by the University of Texas System to
lease University Trust Lands:
Lessor shall share in "take or pay" payments. If any gas purchase contracts,
agreements or any amendments thereto entered into by Lessee for the sale
or disposition of gas or other products under this Agreement should contain
a "take or pay" clause requiring a purchaser of gas to take, or upon failing to
take, to pay for the minimum annual contract volume of gas which a pro-
ducer-seller has available for delivery, then any payments made by such pur-
chaser of gas under such provision, whether or not gas is actually delivered,
shall be subject to the payment of royalty to the Lessor as herein provided.
Upon written request by Lessor, Lessee shall furnish Lessor complete copies
of all such gas purchase contracts or agreements and any amendments
thereto entered into by Lessee for the sale or disposition of gas or other
products produced under this Agreement.
6 RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, WEST'S TEXAS FORMS § 4.2 (John S. Lowe Supp. 1995).
Query, however, whether this language would extend to buy-out or buy-down payments?
99. Killam Oil, 806 S.W.2d at 268.
100. Id. (emphasis in original).
101. 828 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
102. 806 S.W.2d 264.
103. 943 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1991).
104. Hurd, 828 S.W.2d at 106.
105. Id. (citing Killam Oil, 806 S.W.2d at 267).
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cause of the distinguishing royalty clause provisions106 and the Texas
Supreme Court's denial of writ of error in Killam Oil, the court of ap-
peals applied the "law of the case" doctrine to Hurd and refused to over-
turn its prior decision. 1
07
In Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Refining Co.,108 the Texas Court of Ap-
peals for the First District, Houston, relied heavily upon Killam Oil and
held that a lessor was not entitled to share in a take-or-pay settlement,
even though the lease gave the lessor the right to take royalty in kind and
to approve all proposed sales contracts. 0 9 The court noted that "[t]he
lease itself is deemed to express the intent of the parties, unless the terms
are ambiguous," and stressed the care with which the terms before it had
106. In fact, Hurd is based upon differences in the royalty clauses' meaning, not their
language. The royalty provision in Frey provided for a "royalty on gas sold by Lessee [at]
one-fifth (1/5) of the amount realized at the well from such sales," (Frey, 943 F.2d at 580,
quoted in Hurd, 828 S.W.2d at 106) while the Hurd royalty clause called for royalty "on gas
... produced from said land and sold or used off the premises [based on market value and]
on gas sold at the wells [based on the] amount realized." Hurd, 828 S.W.2d at 106. The
facts and context of Killam Oil and Hurd reveal that the issue before the courts was the
application of the "amount realized" portion of the royalty clause. This is obvious from the
reasoning of Killam Oil, which focuses upon whether the take-or-pay payments are part of
the "price paid" for gas. Killam Oil, 806 S.W.2d at 268. Furthermore, in Texas, "market
value" is independent of actual sales, so the price paid or amount realized is logically irrel-
evant to a market value royalty. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex.
1981). See also Carter v. Exxon Corp., 842 S.W.2d 393, 397 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992,
writ denied), discussed infra text accompanying notes 140-43.
Thus, the royalty clause language in Frey and Hurd was substantially the same; both
called for royalty on gas "sold." The distinction between Frey and Hurd is in the underly-
ing law. In Louisiana, gas can be "sold" before "production." See Frey v. Amoco Prod.
Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 176-79 (La. 1992). The Texas Supreme Court has held, however, that
"produced" in the lease royalty clause means physical extraction and "sold" means deliv-
ered. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d at 244 (discussed in Killam Oil, 806 S.W.2d at 267). It follows
that in Texas gas cannot be sold for royalty clause purposes before it is produced.
See also Energy Oils, Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 626 F.2d 731, 738 (9th Cir. 1980) (lump
sum paid as partial consideration for a lease assignment was not "proceeds from the sale of
production" for purposes of calculating payout of a farmout agreement); Monsanto Co. v.
Tyrrell, 537 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(recoupable advance payment made by a gas purchaser to a producer was not a "recovery
from production" that triggered additional royalty). Professor Richard Pierce has distin-
guished these cases, however, as a reflection of the "court's interpretation of the agree-
ment as a means of creating a production based trigger for converting the plaintiff's
interest [from one interest to a more valuable interest]. That purpose would be defeated if
the conversion to a more valuable interest were permitted to take place prior to any pro-
duction." Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lessor/Lessee Relations in a Turbulent Gas Market, 38
INST. ON OIL& GAS L. & TAX'N 8-1, § 8.03[2], n.47 (1987). Professor Bruce Kramer
agrees that "production under those 'payout'-type clauses may have a much different
meaning than production under a basic landowner's royalty clause." Bruce M. Kramer,
Royalty Obligations Under the Gun - The Effect of Take-or-Pay Clauses on the Duty to
Make Royalty Payments, 39 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 5-1, § 5.05[2] (1988). I am
not so sure, at least about Tyrrell. There is no reason that "production" in an additional
royalty clause should have a different meaning from "production" in the habendum clause
of the same lease. See infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
107. Hurd, 828 S.W.2d at 106. The court also held that there was no special relationship
between the lessor and the lessee that would support a finding that the lessee owed the
lessor a fiduciary duty, id. at 107-11, and no confidential relationship that would give rise to
a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 111.
108. 822 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
109. The lessor was not a third party beneficiary of the gas contract either. Id. at 161.
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been negotiated" o in concluding that the royalty owner had no right as
such to share in the take-or-pay settlement because "[p]roduction is the
key to royalty. Royalty does not accrue until gas is produced, that is,
physically severed from the soil.""'
As these cases illustrate, if the courts view the royalty clause as a
straightforward and clear statement of the parties' intent and give effect
to the "plain terms" of the standard royalty clause, which typically keys
royalty to "production" or "sale," lessees need not pay lessors royalty on
take-or-pay payments, settlements, buy-outs, or buy-downs because those
benefits are not triggered by removal of gas from the ground." 2
If the courts look behind the words of the royalty clause to canons of
construction or extrinsic evidence, however, lessees may be held liable to
pay royalty on take-or-pay benefits on reasoning rooted in the minority
view of the market value royalty cases. Frey v. Amoco Production Co." 3
and Klein v. Jones,114 the only reported appellate cases holding that roy-
alty is due on take-or-pay payments, settlements, buy-outs, or buy-downs,
110. Id. at 159-60 (citing Schwartz v. Prairie Producing Co., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 289, 291
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
111. Id. at 165 (citation omitted).
112. Other cases denying royalty on take-or-pay payments or settlements are also gen-
erally consistent with this analysis. In State v. Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1988), the
gas royalty clause provided for royalty on gas "produced from said land and saved and sold
or used off the premises." Id. at 979. The court held that no royalty was due on take-or-
pay payments because the parties did not define their contract terms differently from the
common meaning, and production required "severance of the mineral from the ground."
Id. In Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell, No. 90-715-M Civil, slip op. at 2 (D.N.M. Jan. 19,
1994), a federal district court in New Mexico ruled that royalty due on "gas produced and
saved" to be calculated upon "net proceeds derived from the sale of such gas in the field"
did not extend to take-or-pay payments or settlements because "under the plain language
of the state lease, royalty payments are not due to the lessor until the oil or gas is physically
extracted." Id. slip op. at 6. Cf Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563
(10th Cir. 1989); Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 893 F.2d 349, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(holding that non-recoupable lump-sum payments to settle take-or-pay disputes did not
violate the maximum lawful price for first sales under the Natural Gas Policy Act because
the "prepayments are not payments for gas to the extent that the gas is not taken.").
113. 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992). Frey had an interesting procedural history. The Fifth
Circuit overruled the district court's holding that under Louisiana law a leasehold royalty
owner was not entitled to share in take-or-pay payments or settlements because the pay-
ments were neither made in connection with physical production and severance, nor part
of the sale price of gas. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 708 F. Supp. 783 (E.D. La. 1989). The
lease royalty clause before the district court did not refer to gas "produced," but merely
entitled the royalty owner to a percentage of "the amount realized at the well from such
sales." Id. at 785. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Diamond Shamrock on the grounds that
the royalty clause in Diamond Shamrock required "production," while the clause before it
in Frey was not so limited. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 943 F.2d 578, 581 (5th Cir. 1991).
The court of appeals did not specifically address the royalty owners' implied covenant
claims, which the trial court had rejected, though the opinion's dicta may support that
claim as well. Id. at 583-86. The court also did not distinguish recoupable from non-
recoupable payments; Amoco received $66.5 million in take-or-pay payments - one $45.6
million payment that Columbia could recoup over a five-year period by taking volumes
above the minimum annual purchase requirement, and one $20.9 million non-recoupable
payment. On petition for rehearing, however, the court of appeals certified the question of
royalty on take-or-pay payments to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Frey v. Amoco Prod.
Co., 951 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), cert. granted, 592 So. 2d 1308 (La. 1992).
114. 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992).
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assume that the lease royalty provisions are uncertain so that the royalty
clause must be given meaning by looking behind the language of the lease
to its underlying intent, to implied covenants, or to fundamental
fairness.1 15
In Frey, the Louisiana Supreme Court began by noting Louisiana's
statutory definition of the lessor's royalty:
any interest in production, or its value, from or attributable to land
subject to a mineral lease, that is deliverable or payable to the lessor
or others entitled to share therein. Such interests in production or its
value are 'royalty,' whether created by the lease or by separate in-
strument, if they comprise a part of the negotiated agreement result-
ing in execution of the lease.
116
The court then adopted the premise that neither party had anticipated
the regulatory and market changes that led to take-or-pay settlements, so
"we look not at the parties' intent to provide expressly for take-or-pay
payments, but rather at the parties' general intent in entering an oil and
gas lease ... reflecting the mutuality of objectives and sharing of benefits
inherent in the lessee-lessor relationship. 1 17 The court characterized the
oil and gas lease as a contract'1 8 in which the lessee "avoids having to pay
up front for the privilege of exploration, and the [lessor] ... is guaranteed
participation in any eventual yield accruing from the lessee's en-
trepreneurial efforts,"119 and discussed Wemple v. Producers' Oil Co.,
120
which held that the doctrine of unjust enrichment required that a lessor
whose royalty clause did not refer to casinghead gas be paid royalty on
gasoline extracted from casinghead gas,' 21 and Henry v. Ballard &
Cordell Corp.122 to support its point. Quoting Professor Thomas Harrell,
who coined the term, 23 the Louisiana Supreme Court described the oil
and gas lease as a "cooperative venture" in which "[an economic benefit
accruing from the leased land, generated solely by virtue of the lease, and
115. See also Roye Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Watson, No. 76,848 (Okla. Ct. App. filed July
14, 1992), cert. granted, (Okla. filed Jan. 11, 1993). The appellate court ordered the trial
court to compel the lessee and purchaser to produce the settlement agreement and the
information relating to payments made under the settlement agreement to the lessors be-
cause the lessee had an implied duty to the lessors to market the lessor's oil and gas. The
court reasoned that a take-or-pay provision in a gas purchase contract is "simply a market-
ing substitute," id. slip op. at 1, that allows a purchaser to refuse to buy the gas which
would otherwise be sold and generate a royalty for the lessors. The issue of royalty on
take-or-pay benefits is presently before the Oklahoma Supreme Court as a certified ques-
tion from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. Grabow v. Santa
Fe Int'l Corp., No. CIV-93-2011-R (W.D. Okla. filed Aug. 31, 1994).
116. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-213(5) (West 1992) (quoted in Frey, 603 So. 2d at 171-
72).
117. Frey, 603 So. 2d at 172-73.
118. The court classified the oil and gas lease as a "synallagmatic contract" that imposes
reciprocal obligations. Id. at 173.
119. Id.
120. 83 So. 232 (La. 1919) (discussed in Frey, 603 So. 2d at 173).
121. Wemple, 83 So. at 237. See 3A W.L. SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 594 (1958),
and Hardwicke, supra note 13, at 11-14.
122. 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982), discussed supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
123. Harrell, supra note 81, at 336.
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which is not expressly negated, is to be shared between the lessor and
lessee in the fractional division contemplated by the lease."'1 24 The court
concluded that:
[w]e interpret the "amount realized" ... to encompass both: 1) the
total price paid by Columbia for the natural gas delivered, and 2) the
"economic benefits" derived from the lessee's right to develop and
explore, a right conferred by the lease.
[T]he term "amount realized" connotes the sum total, the
whole, or the final effect of the economic benefits obtained by
Amoco in the exercise of the rights granted by the synallagmatic con-
tract of Lease, and, is composed, in part, of the advantages flowing to
Amoco by virtue of the sale of natural gas under the Morganza
Contract. 1
25
The court specifically rejected the "plain meaning" approach to the roy-
alty clause: "the duty before us is not to divine the intent of the royalty
clause in the abstract. Rather, the process reflects our appreciation of the
cooperative nature of the lease arrangement as well as an understanding
of the economic and practical considerations underlying the royalty
clause."12
6
Klein also accepted the premise that the terms of the royalty clause
have no plain meaning. 127 The facts of Klein were unusual in that the
pipeline simply bought the company that owned the lessees' interests in
the producing wells,' 28 thus acquiring the right to renegotiate its own
take-or-pay contract.' 29 Though the Eighth Circuit rejected the lessors'
claims that they were owed a fiduciary duty by the producers and its
shareholders and were third-party beneficiaries of the gas contract, the
court found liability on an unjust enrichment theory, stating that the facts
"cry for equity intervention.' 130 Noting an unusual Arkansas statute re-
quiring the lessee to share "premiums" or "bonuses" with the lessor,' 3 '
the court observed that:
a restrictive interpretation of the royalties clause in a conventional
lease can be inconsistent with its basic purpose, and can produce re-
124. Frey, 603 So. 2d at 173-74 (citation omitted).
125. Id at 179-80 (emphasis in original).
126. Id. at 181.
127. 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992). The court noted a "developing recognition that a
restrictive interpretation of the royalties clause in a conventional lease can be inconsistent
with its basic purpose, and can produce results that are unintended by the parties, and
unfair to the lessor." Id. at 531.
128. The largest shareholder bought out was Jerry Jones, id. at 523, who used some of
the proceeds he received to purchase the Dallas Cowboys football team. The Cowboys
have undoubtedly proved to be a better investment than most oil and gas deals.
129. Id A class of approximately 3000 royalty owners sued for a share of the purchase
price. Id. The district court granted summary judgment to the lessees because the royalty
owners had not stated a case. Klein, 980 F.2d at 526. The district court would have permit-
ted the royalty owners to recover for breach of the implied covenant to market, but the
statute of limitations barred such a claim. Id.
130. Id at 527.
131. Id. at 529.
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[H]ornbook law... [requires that the clause be] construed in favor
of the lessor, if for no other reason than that the lessor is the unin-
formed and inexpert party to the bargain.
132
The court recognized what it termed the "Harrell rule" that a lease is a
"cooperative venture . . . for the mutual benefit of both parties,"1133 and
remanded the case to the trial court.'
34
The take-or-pay royalty cases have caused a monumental and ironic
"flip-flop" in the positions of lessees and lessors. 135 Oil companies gener-
ally complained bitterly that the majority rule on the meaning of "market
value" was unfair because their gas was sold as soon as it was under con-
tract. They now sing the virtues of a rule that prevents royalty from being
due until there is "production." Royalty owners' counsel in states that
follow the minority rule on market value royalties, who missed out on the
market value litigation frenzy, now contemplate relatively easy pickings
from suits claiming a share of take-or-pay settlements.
132. Id. at 531 (citing 2 W.L. SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 372 (1958)).
133. Klein, 980 F.2d at 531-32.
134. Id. at 533. When Klein v. Jones was considered on remand, the federal district
court held for the lessees on both the unjust enrichment and implied covenants theories.
Klein v. Jones, No. 90-2060, slip op. (W.D. Ark. filed Jan 5, 1994). The court concluded
that there could be no unjust enrichment under Arkansas law because the lessees "had the
legal right to sell their interests... (including the take-or-pay claim) and cannot be said to
have been unjustly enriched because they chose to exercise that legal right." Id. slip op. at
35. The take-or-pay provision compensated the lessee for the risk of drilling. Because the
lessors were at most incidental beneficiaries of the gas contract, the "benefits incidently
acquired by plaintiffs ... were in like manner incidently lost" when the contract was pru-
dently bought down. Id. slip op. at 44-45. The lessees had satisfied their duty to market
when they obtained a price equal to or greater than the market price of gas then currently
being produced or sold, id. slip op. at 62-63, because the settlement permitted the sale of
gas that the purchaser had not been willing to take as well as the drilling of additional
wells. Id. slip op. at 48-49. Even with a breach of the implied covenant, there would have
been no damages, Klein, slip op. at 63, because the amended contract price was greater
than the available market price. Id. slip op. at 40.
Ultimately, however, the Eighth Circuit resoundingly reaffirmed its position. In Klein v.
Arkoma Prod. Co., No. 94-1353, 1996 WL 5660 (8th Cir. Jan. 11, 1996), the Eighth Circuit
held that the district court had failed to follow its mandate. The circuit court stated that it
had held in Klein v. Jones that, as a matter of law, the transactions among Arkoma and its
shareholders, on the one hand, and the Arkla entities, on the other, amounted to a settle-
ment of the royalty owners' take-or-pay claims, for which the Arkoma shareholders re-
ceived a premium price for their stock that was subject to royalty on an unjust enrichment
theory. Id. at *3-*4. Further, the court stated, the transactions breached the implied cove-
nant to market, because:
[t]he implied covenant to market ... necessarily encompasses not only the
duty to make prudent and reasonable business decisions, but the duty to
share the proceeds of those decisions with the lessors. The breach in this
case is neither the decision to settle, nor the decision to reform the contract,
but the failure to share the benefits of the settlement with the beneficial own-
ers of those proceeds.
Id. at *5. In my view, the court's implied covenants analysis confuses the reasonable pru-
dent operator standard with the royalty obligation. See infra note 180.
135. Bondurant, supra note 24, at 590 n.90, notes "the ironic situation of attorneys for
royalty owners adopting the arguments of gas producers set out in the market value royalty
cases and attorneys for producers responding with the royalty owners' former arguments."
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRECEDENT FOR DISPUTES
OVER ROYALTY ON TAKE-OR-PAY BENEFITS
The two lines of market value and royalty on take-or-pay cases, while
equally valid in their logic, are irreconcilable. 136 It is ludicrous to con-
clude that lessors and lessees in adjoining states intended such sharply
different meanings for the same lease terms or such varied financial im-
pacts as the market value and royalty on take-or-pay decisions have
brought. The fundamental interpretative principles' 3 7 have not been con-
sistently applied to lease royalty disputes.
The lines of cases do, however, suggest the competing analyses that the
courts are likely to follow, not just in take-or-pay disputes, 138 but in other
royalty obligation disputes as well. States that adopted the Vela rule in
the market value royalty disputes are likely to refuse to extend the roy-
alty obligation beyond the plain terms of the royalty clause, while those
states that followed the reasoning of Tara may award royalty on such
payments.139
A. "PLAIN TERMS" JURISDIcrIONS
In jurisdictions that define the royalty obligation by looking to the
plain terms of the royalty clause, a "market value" royalty cannot logi-
cally include take-or-pay payments, settlements, buy-outs, or buy-downs
because market value is what a willing buyer and seller would agree upon
when the gas is produced and is independent of the amount the lessee
receives for gas sold. This approach to "market value" royalty clauses is
particularly appropriate in jurisdictions applying the Vela rule. So long as
the lessee pays the lessor a royalty at least equal to the market value of
the gas when it is produced, the lessor should have no complaint. Carter
v. Exxon Corp. 140 illustrates the reasoning. In Carter, the Texas Court of
Appeals in Eastland held that a lease calling for royalty based upon
"market value at the well" did not allow the market value of gas used to
manufacture liquid products to be determined by "working back" from
the sales price of the liquid products.' 41 The court reasoned that the "at
136. This statement is not made lightly. I spent three weeks fruitlessly trying to develop
a theory to rationalize these cases.
137. See supra notes 32-47 and accompanying text.
138. Some commentators have treated royalty on take-or-pay payments and royalty on
take-or-pay settlements, buy-outs or buy-downs as separate issues. See, e.g., Pierce, supra
note 106, at 8-19 to 8-20; John S. Lowe, Current Lease and Royalty Problems in the Gas
Industry, 23 TULSA L.J. 547, 563 (1988). As Professors Smith and Weaver have noted,
however, the arguments are virtually identical. 1 ERNEST E. SMrrH & JACQUELINE L.
WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 4.6(E)(6), at 210 (1994). Therefore, I shall not
make such a distinction in this Article.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 49 to 58, for a list of jurisdictions that appear to
have adopted one rule or the other on the meaning of market value.
140. 842 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, writ denied).
141. Id. at 397. Carter is merely the final step, however, in well-established reasoning.
The courts have long recognized that determining market value requires a look at the
existing markets. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ochsner, 146 F.2d 138, 141 (5th Cir.
1944) and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Record, 146 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1944) (where gas had no
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the well" reference of the lease called for royalty to be determined "for
gas that is produced in its natural state, not on the components of the gas
that are later extracted."'1 42 Furthermore, "[m]arket value is to be calcu-
lated the instant the gas is produced from the reservoir .... The liquid
products valuation method is, therefore, not permitted by the leases be-
cause it involves a determination of market value after the gas is
produced."143
Take-or-pay benefits logically could be subject to royalty, nevertheless,
under a lease calling for royalty based upon "amount realized," "amount
received," or "proceeds" even in a state that has adopted the Vela rule to
govern market value disputes. Though "market value" in such a state is
independent of the lessee's actual receipts, "amount realized," "amount
received," or "proceeds" is based upon those receipts.
The issue then becomes whether to treat the take-or-pay benefit as re-
ceived for "production." On this, the cases are inconsistent.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Frey considered take-or-pay benefits
to be additional proceeds for gas that had already been produced:
Because the producer is willing to negotiate a lower price in ex-
change for the guarantee the pipeline will either take or pay for a
specific minimum quantity of natural gas, the take-or-pay provision
effectively lowers the price the producer charges the pipeline per
unit of gas. Consequently, absent the take-or-pay provision, the
price of gas, and thus the royalty owed thereon, would be higher.1 4'
In Diamond Shamrock, the Fifth Circuit rejected the idea that take-or-
pay payments are additional proceeds for gas previously produced, in
part because take-or-pay payments are not for "production.' 1 45 Subse-
quent administrative actions involving federal leases, however, have at-
tempted to distinguish between past and future production and between
take-or-pay payments and take-or-pay settlements, buy-outs, or buy-
downs. Though the Department of the Interior initially acquiesced in the
result of Diamond Shamrock,146 in the early months of the Clinton ad-
value at the well, except for the manufacture of gasoline, evidence of prices paid elsewhere
for gas for light and fuel was inadmissible). When there is a viable free market and the gas
being valued is available to go to that market, the free market should value the royalty.
142. Carter, 842 S.W.2d at 397. The court relied upon Sowell v. Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. of Am., 789 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1986).
143. Carter, 842 S.W.2d at 397. Presumably, market value is to be determined by work-
ing back from the hub spot market price if there is no market at the well. See Hardwick &
Hayes, supra note 24, at 11-22. David E. Pierce, supra note 24, at § 18.01.
144. Frey, 603 So. 2d at 180 (citation omitted).
145. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1165. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying
text.
146. See Revision of Gross Proceeds Definition in Oil and Gas Valuation Regulations,
53 Fed. Reg. 45,082 (1988) (amending Department of the Interior regulations codified at 30
C.F.R. § 206 (1988)). See also Blackwood & Nichols Co., Ltd., [10 Royalty Valuation &
Mgmt.] Gower Fed. Serv. (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found.) MMS-88-0008-O&G (Dept. of the
Interior, Apr. 20, 1989) (MMS Director reversed assessment calling for royalties on un-
recoupable buy-out payment); and Wolverine Exploration Co., [10 Royalty Valuation &
Mgmt.] Gower Fed. Serv. (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found.) MMS-88-0052-IND (Dept. of the
Interior, May 2, 1990) (MMS Director reversed assessment of royalties on non-recoupable
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ministration the Minerals Management Service (MMS) issued a "Dear
Payor" letter to all those who paid royalty under federal or Indian
leases. 147 The "Dear Payor" letter stated a rationale for claiming royalty
on take-or-pay settlements, buy-outs, and buy-downs, notwithstanding
Diamond Shamrock. The letter reasoned that production of the bought-
out or bought-down volumes "continues from the lease under any succes-
sor contract with any purchaser during the term of the original con-
tract,"'148 because the payment "compensates the lessee for lower prices
in the future."'1 49 By this reasoning, when production occurs within the
term of the original contract but after a settlement, it triggers a royalty on
the proportionate part of settlement payments.
In Samedan Oil Corp.,15° the Department of the Interior considered
claims by the MMS, based upon the "Dear Payor" letter, to share in take-
or-pay contract buy-out payments made by a pipeline purchaser to
Samedan. 151 The Department of the Interior adopted the reasoning of
the letter,152 noting that the "Dear Payor" letter "simply reflects the es-
tablished principle that the lessee's gross proceeds consist of the total
consideration paid to the lessee for the sale of gas produced from the
lease" 53 and characterizing the amounts paid to buy out Samedan's gas
purchase contract as attributable to gas Samedan subsequently sold on
the spot market:
Samedan effectively received two payments for gas it produced. It
received the amount from the successor purchasers ... on which it
has already paid royalties. It also received the additional $89,706.00
from [the pipeline]. It is simply illogical to categorize the payment
settlement of take-or-pay obligation though the pipeline had make-up rights at the time of
the settlement and gas was produced and sold after the settlement).
147. See "Dear Payor" Letter, [D Royalty Valuation & Mgmt.] Gower Fed. Serv.
(Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found.) at 9-635 (Dept. of the Interior, May 3, 1993).
148. Id. at 9-639.
149. Id.
150. [16 Royalty Valuation & Mgmt.] Gower Fed. Serv. (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found.)
MMS-94-0003-IND (Dept. of the Interior, Sept. 16, 1994). The Department of the Interior
reached a similar result in Shell Offshore, Inc., [13 Royalty Valuation & Mgmt.] Gower
Fed. Serv. (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found.) MMS-91-0087-DLS (Dept. of the Interior, Sept. 2,
1994). For a discussion of Samedan, see Michael J. Henke, Rhubarb Over Royalties, NAT.
GAS, Dec. 1994, at 29.
151. As the federal district court noted in Samedan, federal leases provide for royalties
based upon "value." Samedan, slip op. at 21. Regulations expand that term, however:
"[Ujnder no circumstances shall the value of production for royalty purposes be less than
the gross proceeds accruing to the lessee for lease production, less applicable transporta-
tion allowances and processing allowances .... ." 30 C.F.R. § 206.152(h) (1994) (un-
processed gas); see also id. § 206.153(h) (processed gas). "Gross proceeds" are further
defined as the "total monies and other consideration accruing to an oil and gas lessee for
the disposition of" production. Id. § 206.151. See also id. § 206.150 (Indian leases). A
history of federal royalties may be found in John L. Price, Evolution of Federal Royalty
Management Regulation, 45 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N § 6.01 (1994).
152. The "Dear Payor" letter was not a binding order or regulation. It merely stated
the position of the MMS' Associate Director for Royalty Management. Samedan, slip op.
at 9.
153. Id. at 10.
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from [the pipeline] as anything but a payment that Samedan received
for gas it produced.
154
The Department of the Interior concluded that, because "[t]he pay-
ment ... is made in anticipation of the producer receiving a lower price
for gas if production continues,"1155 the buy-out payments were subject to
royalty during the term of the bought-out contract on a monthly produc-
tion basis. 156 The payment "is part of what the lessee receives for the gas
when it is delivered, and effectively is no different from a prepayment.' 1 57
This analysis, the Department of the Interior reasoned, would result in
royalties on buy-out payments only when the gas was actually produced,
which complies with Diamond Shamrock's "actual production
requirement."l5
8
When Samedan was appealed to a federal district court in Independent
Petroleum Ass'n of America v. Babbitt, 59 the MMS was upheld. The
IPAA and Samedan argued on appeal that the Department was bound by
Diamond Shamrock and that Samedan was inconsistent with Diamond
Shamrock.160 The court distinguished Samedan from Diamond Sham-
rock, however, largely following the reasoning of the "Dear Payor" letter.
The court noted that Diamond Shamrock did not deal with whether roy-
alty was due on lump sum settlements.' 61 Quoting the "Dear Payor" let-
ter at length,162 the court accepted the Department of the Interior's
construction of "gross proceeds" to include take-or-pay buy-outs and
non-recoupable payments for accrued liabilities. 63 The court reasoned
that the settlement payments were "'part of the benefit which the lessee
derives from that production.' "64 The court further argued that the in-
terpretation was necessary to avoid unjust enrichment, because "[i]f pro-
ducers were permitted to retain 100% of non-recoupable settlement
payments .... producers would have an incentive to negotiate with pipe-
lines for large non-recoupable payments in exchange for drastically re-
duced future gas prices," which might breach the implied covenants to
154. Id. at 15.
155. Id. at 17.
156. The buy-out price is divided by the total estimated future production volumes
bought out to determine an amount per MMBtu. This amount is then added to the amount
realized from sale on a monthly basis as gas is actually produced for the remainder of the
term of the bought-out contract. Id. at 13.
157. Samedan, slip op. at 17.
158. Id. at 30.
159. Nos. 93-2544 and 94-2123, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10163, *1 (D.C. June 14, 1995).
This decision has been appealed. IPAA v. Babbitt is only the beginning of what will likely
be a long process of testing the implications of the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Dia-
mond Shamrock.
160. IPAA at *22. Samedan also urged (and the court rejected) a variety of procedural
grounds, most notably that the "Dear Payor" letter constituted a rule-making for which the
government had failed to follow the procedures required by the Administrative Procedures
Act. Id. at *7-*18.
161. Id. at *23.
162. Id. at *33-*35.
163. Id. at *35.
164. IPAA at *34 (quoting Samedan, slip op. at 17).
1996]
SMU LAW REVIEW
market or operate prudently. 165 The court rejected Samedan's argument
that settlement payments were merely a substitute for damages for
breach of contract, which would not be subject to royalty, as "interesting,
but irrelevant. The case at hand does not involve damages."'
1 66
The Department of the Interior's reasoning in Samedan and IPAA was
resoundingly rejected by another district court, however, in In re Century
Offshore Management Corp. ,167 an appeal from a summary judgment in a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. Century possessed a gas contract
with Enron Corporation that called for payment of non-recoupable take-
or-pay payments.' 68 The parties agreed to terminate the agreement for a
lump sum payment based upon the present value of the non-recoupable
payments.169 During Century's reorganization, the MMS claimed addi-
tional royalties of more than $1,800,000 based upon the reasoning of the
"Dear Payor" letter and the decisions applying it.170 The bankruptcy
court rejected the claim and granted summary judgment for the debtor on
the basis of Diamond Shamrock.171 The district court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky affirmed, holding that the claim for royalty on the
take-or-pay settlement exceeded the MMS' authority and was arbitrary
and capricious. 172 MMS had exceeded its authority because:
Enron's payment to Century was not for present or future deliveries
of severed natural gas to Enron; rather it was to terminate Enron's
future obligations .... A royalty is not due on a take-or-pay pay-
ment because that payment was not made for severed gas but rather
because the purchaser failed to purchase gas. By interpreting "gross
165. Id. at *35-*36.
166. Id. at *37. The court concluded with "a word about risk allocation," id. at *38-*39,
refuting Diamond Shamrock's observation that lessors do not "shoulder the associated
risks of exploration, production and development." Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1167.
The court identified three risks that an oil and gas lease might allocate between lessor and
lessee: "(1) fluctuations in market price; (2) lower-than-expected recoverable quantities of
gas; and (3) cost overruns in exploration, development, and production." IPAA at *39.
The court concluded that an oil and gas lease is structured "to share price and quantity
risks while assigning all cost risk to the lessee," id. at *41, so that "any alteration of price or
quantity risk by the lessee - e.g., via take-or-pay provisions or settlements of various
types-should be shared by the lessor." Id. Noting that "[elven non-recoupable take-or-
pay revenues would be royalty-bearing if this risk-sharing logic is accepted," id. at *42, the
court concluded that "[w]ith all due respect to the Fifth Circuit, this court would not find
that DOI had violated its statutory authority if it were to adopt regulations" making take-
or-pay revenues subject to royalty even without make-up production. Id.
The court's reasoning appears flawed. As the Diamond Shamrock court used the term,
"cost risk" means "exploration, production, and development costs," which the lessee must
bear alone. Furthermore, the force of the argument goes to whether the lessee has
breached an implied covenant, rather than to the royalty obligation. See infra note 180.
167. 185 B.R. 734 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
168. Id. at 736-37.
169. Id. at 737.
170. Id.
171. Id. The bankruptcy judge's scathing rejection of the MMS' claims, which formed
the basis for the reasoning of the district court, may be found at Judgment, No. 93-51340
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. filed Feb. 13, 1985). The bankruptcy court ridiculed the Samedan reason-
ing because "[tihe MMS' argument that Enron's payment was a prepayment for gas is the
exact same argument that ... was rejected by the Fifth Circuit." Id. at 10.
172. In re Century Offshore Management, 185 B.R. at 740.
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proceeds" to include payments made not for natural gas, but rather
to terminate a contractual obligation, the MMS exceeded its ...
authority.
173
The court set out several reasons that it considered the MMS' claim
.arbitrary and capricious. First, the MMS' interpretation would require
two royalty payments-one on the production itself and another on the
settlement proceeds allocated to the sale.174 Second, since the purpose of
the take-or-pay payment provision is to apportion the risks of develop-
ment and production between the buyer and seller of gas-risks that the
lessor disclaims by leasing-"it would be irrational to let the government
share in any revenues that the producer realized by taking those risks."'
1 75
Third, the two-year limit on refunds for royalty overpayments 176 would
often deprive producers of the opportunity to claim refunds because of
the government's failure to pursue its claims between 1988 and 1992.177
Finally, "it is nonsensical to claim that any portion of the settlement pay-
ment is part of the 'fair market value' of gas sold at a later time under a
different contract," because "if the purchaser does not take gas under the
original gas purchase contract, there is no market for that gas."'1 78 The
Kentucky federal district court refused to follow IPAA v. Babbitt, which it
had reviewed and considered, because it was not binding and was still on
appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit.179
Ultimately, I submit that the reasoning that led some courts to adopt
the Vela rule in the market value disputes should also preclude those
courts from concluding that take-or-pay benefits are the "amount real-
ized," "amount received," or "proceeds" from production. 180 The plain
173. Id. (citation omitted).
174. Id. at 741.
175. Id.
176. 43 U.S.C. § 1339 (1988).
177. In re Century Offshore Management, 185 B.R. at 741.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 742. The court also held that the MMS' claim was based upon an interpreta-
tion that was unlawfully retroactive. Id. at 741.
180. It is possible, of course, that courts in states that have adopted the Vela rule will
grant royalty owners a share of take-or-pay payments, settlements, buy-outs, or buy-downs
on some other theory, such as that the royalty owner is a third-party beneficiary; that the
lease is a relational contract; or that the lessee has breached the implied covenant to mar-
ket. See 3A W. L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 589A at 42-44 (John S. Lowe
Supp. 1995). Of these theories, the implied covenant to market theory is the strongest, but
its strength varies with the facts. Clearly there is an implied covenant that the lessee will
market the lessor's gas at the best available price. It does not logically follow, however,
that the lessor is entitled to share in every payment to the lessee. The lessee's obligation is
generally expressed as that of a reasonable prudent operator, not that of a fiduciary or
guarantor. The lease is a business deal, and the appropriateness of the parties' actions
should be judged by the standards of business, rather than the precepts of trusts or insur-
ers. While imposing liability for failure to pay royalty on take-or-pay benefits is "but a
step," John S. Lowe, Current Lease and Royalty Problems in the Gas Industry, 23 TULSA
L.J. 547, 563 (1988), from recognition of an implied obligation to market at the best avail-
able terms, we may expect to see courts reject lessors' demands to share in take-or-pay
payments based on an implied covenants theory. The payments are commercially reason-
able in the gas industry and do not adversely affect the lessor's right to receive royalty
when the gas is produced and sold.
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meaning of words like "production" and "sale," usually found in royalty
provisions, simply does not encompass take-or-pay benefits or other pay-
ments made in lieu of production.181 The royalty compensates the lessor
for the lessee's maintenance of the lease during the secondary term.
Courts in most states have required severance of oil and gas to constitute
"production" to maintain an oil and gas lease during the secondary
term.182 If "production" for habendum clause purposes requires sever-
Claims for a share of take-or-pay settlements, buy-downs, and buy-outs, however, may
be another story. The classic and easy application of the implied covenant to market oc-
curs when a lessee exchanges a benefit that the market or a contract would allocate to its
lessor for a benefit to itself or to some other lessor. That is precisely what happens in most
take-or-pay settlements. Generally, the lessee receives a cash payment in exchange for
either a release or a modification of volume or price obligations imposed upon the pur-
chaser by the gas contract. In either event, the lessee trades contract terms that benefit
both the lessor and the lessee for terms that benefit only the lessee. In this situation, the
lessee's judgment should be scrutinized under the reasonable prudent operator standard
on a case-by-case basis. If the lessee's judgment or the structure of the settlement fails to
meet this standard, there is a strong argument that the benefits of the settlement, buy-
down, or buy-out should be shared proportionately.
There are two caveats to this analysis. First, even if one concludes that the lessee has
breached the implied covenant to market in a particular circumstance by settling take-or-
pay claims or in structuring a take-or-pay settlement in a particular way, it does not neces-
sarily follow that the appropriate measure of the lessor's damage is the royalty share of the
benefits that the lessee received. The damage may be greater (e.g., royalties based upon
the "old" contract price) or lesser (e.g., the difference between the "new" contract price
and what the court finds that the lessee should have obtained for the lessor).
Second, in Texas, the lessor's remedy under the implied covenant to market theory ap-
parently is precluded by the definition of "production." In Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Ref.
Co., 822 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied), the court rejected
the lessor's implied covenants claim for a portion of a take-or-pay claim settlement, stating:
A lessee's covenants to its lessors pertain to production of gas .... Under
the marketing covenant, the lessee must make certain that gas that is pro-
duced is sold for the best price or under the best terms.
Take or pay is not a payment for production; it is a payment for nonpro-
duction.... A take or pay payment that comes before gas is actually pro-
duced and taken cannot be a payment for the sale of gas.
Production is the key to royalty .... We hold that take or pay is not a
benefit that [the lessors] received via execution of the lease with [the lessee]
and does not flow from the marketing covenant of the lease. [The lessee]
was required to obtain for [the lessors] only benefits received that were re-
lated to the sale of gas that had been produced.
Id. at 164-65 (citations omitted).
181. As the Texas Supreme Court noted in Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240,
244 (Tex. 1981), "for royalty to become payable, gas must be 'produced from said land and
sold or used off the premises. . . .' Production means actual physical extraction of the
mineral from the land. Under the royalty clause, production of gas is a prerequisite to its
sale or use." See also Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 234 ("a gas sale contract is executory and
... no particular gas is sold until it is identified-i.e., brought to the surface.... Shell could
not 'sell' the gas... because a 'sale' consists in the passing of title .... ); State v. Pennzoil
Co., 752 P.2d 975, 980 (Wyo. 1988) ("Neither Pennzoil or [sic] Marathon could acquire any
interest (title) in the gas which they could transfer to CIG until it was produced and sev-
ered from the land. It could not be produced and severed until it had been brought to the
surface.").
182. See 2 EUGENE 0. Kurrz, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 26.6 (1995).
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ance, 183 it is "somewhat unlikely that the parties intended for 'produc-
tion' to mean something different when used in the royalty clause."'
184
The case against a royalty claim for buy-out or buy-down payments is
particularly strong in a jurisdiction predisposed to a "plain meaning" in-
terpretation. The whole point of a buy-out or buy-down is to relieve the
producer from the obligation to produce and the purchaser from the duty
to take production or pay for non-production. Moreover, in a buy-out,
there is typically no legal or economic connection between the original
contract and what the MMS termed "the successor agreement."'1 85 In
Samedan,186 SONAT made the buy-out payment, while TransOk and
Hadson bought the released gas on the spot market. 187 Thus, concluding
that "the amount paid by the original purchaser to be relieved of its obli-
gation to take the gas is part of the benefit which the lessee derives from
that [future] production"'188 ignores both the royalty clause and the eco-
nomic reality of the transaction.'
8 9
B. COOPERATIVE VENTURE JURISDIcrIONS
Eventually, even courts that are not constrained by precedent' 90 proba-
bly will adopt the cooperative venture analysis. But the cooperative ven-
ture theory does not require finding royalty due on take-or-pay benefits.
183. Indeed, by this logic even "production," by itself, may not trigger royalty, because
most states require actual production marketed in paying quantities. JOHN S. LOWE, OIL
AND GAS LAw IN A NUTSHELL 186-87 (3d ed. 1995). Sondrol v. Placid Oil Co., 23 F.3d
1341 (8th Cir. 1994), held that royalty owners with a proceeds royalty clause were not
entitled to royalty on stored gas until the gas was sold and proceeds were received by the
lessee. Id. at 1344. The lessee was unable to sell all of the gas it produced because there
was no market for it, so the lessee stored the gas and sold it several years later when prices
had dropped. When the stored gas was sold, the lessee paid royalty based upon the sales
price. Id. at 1343. The Sondrols contended that they were entitled to royalties on the
stored gas when it was stored based on the price of gas at the time of production. The
Eighth Circuit disagreed, holding that "proceeds" means "the money obtained from an
actual sale," so that production that generates no cash proceeds or tangible, non-monetary
consideration triggers no royalty requirement. Id. at 1344 (quoting Matzen v. Cities Serv.
Oil Co., 667 P.2d 337, 347 (Kan. 1983), cert. dismissed, 472 U.S. 1023 (1985)).
184. SMrrH & WEAVER, supra note 138, at 211-13.
185. Samedan, slip op. at 17.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 3.
188. Independent Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, Nos. 93-2544 and 94-2123, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10163 at *25 (D.C. June 14, 1995).
189. In fact, Hurd Enters. Ltd. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101, 104 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1992, writ denied), see supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text, apparently involved a
contract buy-out.
190. Even a court in a jurisdiction that has never directly addressed the market value or
royalty on take-or-pay issues may feel bound by other plain meaning interpretations of the
jurisdiction. Whether or not words have plain meaning is not an issue limited to royalty
disputes. See, e.g., Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d 680, 687 (Mont.
1995) (holding plain meaning of grant of "coal and coal rights" was to sever coalbed meth-
ane gas from the coal estate).
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1. The Merits of Cooperative Venture Analysis
At least three factors support the conclusion that the cooperative ven-
ture theory will become widely accepted.
First, the theory that the lease is a cooperative venture makes sense in
lease transactions. Stating royalty as a percentage of production or its
value is a hedge against the inherent uncertainties of mineral develop-
ment. 91 If the parties could anticipate with reasonable certainty the
quantity of the substances that they would find, they might fix a lump
sum or a unit price for royalty. With oil and gas, however, the presence
of the substance, let alone its quantity, is uncertain. Therefore, the par-
ties to a lease or royalty instrument typically express royalty as a portion
of production or its value if oil or gas is produced. If production is pro-
lific, the royalty interest benefits proportionately more from the percent-
age royalty than if production is slight. Essentially, the lease is an
economic partnership between the lessor, who owns the minerals, and the
lessee, who possesses the money and expertise to develop the minerals.
192
"Cooperative venture" is an accurate description.
Second, examining the plain terms of the lease to determine which pay-
ments the royalty should share makes little sense in the context in which
leases are made and used. Experience suggests that the parties to oil and
gas leases make no fine distinction between "market value" and "amount
realized" or "sale" and "production" in lease forms.' 93 "[G]enerally the
only apparent intention of the parties is for the lessor to get no less than
other lessors and the lessee to pay no more than other lessees."' 94 Fur-
thermore, before the mid-1980s, neither lessors nor lessees contemplated
the kind of environment in which oil and gas are now produced and
sold. 195 A typical lease royalty clause has plain meaning only in the con-
text of traditional sales in the field; we are doing business in the age of
the computer chip with lease forms drafted (and sometimes executed) in
the age of the Model A Ford.
Finally, the history of royalty disputes also supports the cooperative
venture theory. The cases denying royalty owners a share of take-or-pay
payments or settlements have generally reasoned that royalty is due upon
production, and there is no production until the gas has been physically
191. This principle has long been recognized. See EUGENE 0. KuNrz ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 248 (2d ed. 1993); R.S. MORRISON & EMILIO D.
DE SOTO, OIL AND GAS RIGHTS 41 (1920).
192. John S..Lowe, Representing the Landowner in Oil and Gas Leasing Transactions,
31 OKLA. L. REv. 257, 268 (1978). Because the lessee possesses the operating rights, the
position of the lessor might be seen as akin to a limited partner. Id. at 269.
193. Both lessors and lessees are generally aware that relatively few oil and gas leases
are ever drilled. Lessors typically focus on the size of the bonus and delay rentals being
offered. Lessees typically focus on acquiring the right to drill rather than paying the roy-
alty on a successful well. In fact, most leases are taken by lease brokers or contract land-
men on printed forms commonly used in the area, rather than on forms crafted by the
ultimate lessee.
194. Sneed, supra note 13, at 643.
195. See supra notes 1-11.
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severed from the ground. 196 While it is historically true that royalty has
been tied to production, that may be so because royalty has been payable
in kind, and without production there would be no in-kind royalty. Where
royalty is due in cash, however, nothing in the history of the royalty
clause bars a broader concept of royalty. 197 Indeed, early oil and gas
leases looked very much like joint venture agreements and often did not
even use the term "royalty."'
1 98
Recent cases on the analogous claims of the states and federal govern-
ment to royalty on tax reimbursements may be a harbinger of the direc-
tion that the cases will take. Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Utah Department of
Natural Resources'99 is an example. 200 In Enron, the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed an assessment of royalty by the Division of State Lands
and Forestry on ad valorem and severance tax reimbursements paid to
Enron in accordance with gas purchase contracts for gas produced from
state lands. 201 Under the terms of its leases, Enron was obligated to pay a
121/2% royalty based on the " 'reasonable market value at the well of all
gas produced and saved or sold from the leased premises' " but " 'in no
event shall the price for gas be less than that received by the United
States of America for its royalties from gas of like grade and quality from
the same field.' "202 The court ruled that "the stated price plus tax reim-
bursements constitute the consideration that a willing buyer pays a will-
ing seller and together they equal the 'reasonable market value' of the
gas," 203 specifically rejecting the dissent's argument that Enron had re-
ceived the tax reimbursements in return for its commitment of the gas to
contract rather than as part of the price for the gas.2°4 The court said that
"[t]here is ... no practical difference between consideration for the gas
and consideration for a commitment to a long-term contract.
'20 5
196. See supra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
197. "Production is not the only way a producer receives value from an asset; federal
agricultural price supports, for example, pay farmers for not producing crops." White,
supra note 24, at 668.
198. See, e.g., the oil and gas leases quoted in Leslie Moses, The Evolution and Devel-
opment of the Oil and Gas Lease, 2 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 1, 6-7 (1951) and lease
form II in GEORGE BRYAN, THE LAW OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS 416-18 (1898).
199. 871 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994).
200. There are many such cases. See also Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Department of Reve-
nue & Taxation, 820 P.2d 977, 982 (Wyo. 1991) ("Purchasers ... are clearly willing to pay
not only the maximum price permitted by the NGPA, but also a price enhanced by the
reimbursement of both the severance and ad valorem taxes assessed by the State of Wyo-
ming."); Cities Serv. Oil & Gas Corp. v. State, 838 P.2d 146, 155 (Wyo. 1992) ("what is to
be the amount is the actuality created in finite result."); Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Lujan, 978
F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that state severance tax reimbursements may be
included as part of a lessee's gross proceeds when calculating royalty valuation of gas
production).
201. Enron, 871 P.2d at 510.
202. Id at 509 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-18, repealed by Laws 1988 ch. 121, § 18
[sic]).
203. Id. at 510.
204. Id. at 511.
205. Id. It is interesting to note that the court did not overrule, and addressed only
indirectly, the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), which held that reimbursements
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The royalty disputes in severance tax cases are distinguishable from
lessor/lessee royalty disputes, of course, because courts tend to defer to
the claims of public agencies. 20 6 In addition, severance tax reimburse-
ments are paid for production and sale of gas under the contracts that
provide for the reimbursements, rather than in lieu of production; a sev-
erance tax reimbursement is more easily characterized as part of the price
of gas produced and sold than is a take-or-pay benefit. The reasoning of
the royalty on severance tax cases, 207 however, illustrates the attraction of
the cooperative venture theory. The private royalty owner is surely as
much a partner in the producer's economic venture as is the state.
2. Are Take-or-Pay Benefits Within the Cooperative Venture?
In states that treat the oil and gas lease as a cooperative venture, par-
ticularly those that have adopted the Tara reasoning that market value
must normally be based upon contract price, royalty owners are more
likely to win royalty on take-or-pay benefits than in plain terms jurisdic-
tions.208 The premise that the terms of the royalty clause lack a plain
meaning opens the door to considering the lease a cooperative venture.
If there is no plain meaning, the courts are free to look behind the words
to the relationship of the parties.
Describing the lease as a cooperative venture does not settle the issue,
however. The problem becomes how to describe the payments. In eco-
nomic terms, a take-or-pay payment is a deficiency-based demand
charge 209-a payment for the lessee's agreement to hold gas from the
for occupational and conservation taxes, while part of the total value of the gas contract,
were not part of the value of the gas itself for royalty purposes. Id. at 268.
206. See also Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Department of the Interior, 931 F.2d
318, 326 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1058 (1992) (holding that the Department of
the Interior might properly include reimbursements for gas treatment costs within gross
proceeds for royalty purposes).
207. Cases relating to the application of state severance taxes to severance tax reim-
bursements may also support royalty on take-or-pay benefits. In 3300 Corp. v. Marx, 633
So. 2d 1028, 1034 (Miss. 1994), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that reimbursements
for severance taxes by a gas purchaser are part of the "sales price" of gas and, therefore,
subject to severance taxes. Mississippi levies a severance tax upon persons producing or
severing natural gas. Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-25-703 (1972 & Supp. 1994). The tax is mea-
sured by the value of the gas and is assessed at 6% of the value, which is defined as "the
sales price, or market value." 3300 Corp., 633 So. 2d at 1030. Noting that the tax reim-
bursement was " 'simply a novel way to increase the sales price of the gas,'" id. at 1031
(quoting the brief of the Tax Commission), the court held that the reimbursement received
by 3300 Corporation should be considered part of the price the purchaser was willing to
pay for the gas and therefore subject to taxation. Id. at 1034. See also State v. Moncrief,
720 P.2d 470 (Wyo. 1986).
208. By my count, only Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Arkansas have followed the Tara
reasoning.
209. A demand charge is an amount paid to have a service or a specified volume of the
commodity available, and does not vary with actual use. For example, the flat charge for
local service from the telephone company is a demand charge. A demand charge is usually
contrasted with a commodity charge, a payment for the amount of a service or commodity
actually received. A commodity charge is based upon actual use. A deficiency-based de-
mand charge is triggered only if an agreed reservation of service is not used.
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spot market for delivery to a particular contract.210 By this view, the
take-or-pay payment compensates the lessee for its commitment of ser-
vice, not for the sale of a good.211 Take-or-pay settlements, buy-outs, or
buy-downs likewise may be seen as compensation for the market risk that
the lessee took in choosing to develop, rather than as amounts received
for gas. 21
2
On the other hand, as the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded, "the
right not to take gas is merely a corollary of the right to take gas....
Columbia would not have bargained for the right not to take gas although
paying as if it had, without having the right to take gas."'213 In the context
in which gas contracts with take-or-pay clauses were generally exe-
cuted-long-term commitments of specific leases to specific gas con-
tracts-there is a strong argument that payments, settlements, buy-outs,
or buy-downs were benefits of the cooperative venture and so should be
shared by the parties. The Louisiana Supreme Court may have had com-
mitment in mind when it noted in Frey that:
The benefits which accrue to Amoco under the Morganza Contract
are derivative of the rights transferred to Amoco by Frey. Clearly, but
for the Lease there would be no Morganza Contract, no Settlement
Agreement, and ultimately no take-or-pay payments made to Amoco.
Henry, supra, is authority for this determination. Therefore, even if
we failed to find the take-or-pay proceeds constitute part of the price
received by Amoco for the sale of natural gas, the payments none-
theless are economic benefits which accrue to the lessor under the
rationale of Henry. See also Wemple, supra.214
There are at least two flaws in this reasoning. First, it relies heavily
upon unjust enrichment theory. Second, it ignores the historical and logi-
cal limits to the royalty obligation.
a. The Effect of Unjust Enrichment Theory
Both the Louisiana Supreme Court in Frey and the Eighth Circuit in
Klein relied heavily on unjust enrichment analysis.215 It is unclear, how-
ever, whether other states that have adopted the Tara rule for the market
value disputes-particularly Oklahoma-will give unjust enrichment the
weight that the Frey and Klein courts gave it. The Oklahoma Supreme
210. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1167. See also KuNrz ET AL., supra note 191, at
251.
211. Other methods of description may lead to the same result. See Hurd Enters., Ltd.
v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101, 104 n.3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied) ("The pur-
pose of the take-or-pay provision is to give the producer a continuous, stable, and assured
source of revenue to cover the fixed charges such as service on its indebtedness, mainte-
nance costs, and its initial capital investment." Id. (citing SMrrH & WEAVER, supra note
138, at 211, and Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1167)).
212. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1167.
213. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 178 (La. 1992) (citation omitted).
214. ld at 180-81 (emphasis added). The court cited Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp.,
418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982) and Wemple v. Producers' Oil Co., 83 So. 232 (La. 1919). Inter-
estingly, however, commitment does not appear essential to Frey's reasoning.
215. See supra notes 113-34 and accompanying text.
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Court was concerned about fairness to both lessors and lessees in Tara216
but never mentioned unjust enrichment. Indeed, the Oklahoma jurispru-
dence in the casinghead gasoline cases, the royalty dispute perhaps most
analogous to the royalty on take-or-pay benefits debate, is very different
from that of Louisiana.
Early oil and gas leases rarely contained specific royalty provisions cov-
ering casinghead gas.2 17 Leases drafted before casinghead gas became
valuable typically provided for a one-eighth royalty on oil but for a flat
rental on gas wells.218 The proliferation of motor vehicles and the explo-
sion of technology between 1910 and 1920219 made the extraction of gaso-
line from casinghead gas extremely profitable and led to disputes over
whether royalty was due on casinghead gas as oil or gas royalty. In Wem-
ple v. Producers' Oil Co.,220 the Louisiana Supreme Court applied the
theory of unjust enrichment and held that the lessor was due an oil roy-
alty upon casinghead gasoline extracted unless the lessee could show that
the extraction of casinghead gasoline involved proportionately greater
expense than oil production.221 When the Oklahoma Supreme Court
confronted this problem, however, it reasoned that since casinghead gaso-
line was not mentioned in either royalty clause provision, it was neither
oil nor gas, and ownership of casinghead gas remained in the lessor.
222
The court concluded that the lessee who produced casinghead gasoline
was a good faith trespasser, entitled to recover only the reasonable costs
of production from gasoline revenues.223 The court specifically declined
to make an "equitable contract" for the parties224 because that was "not a
power conferred upon the court. '225 This case and others that followed
similar reasoning226 suggest that although Oklahoma will probably recog-
nize the cooperative venture theory, the state courts may hesitate to ex-
tend it to make the lessor and the lessee share take-or-pay benefits.
227
216. 630 P.2d at 1272-75.
217. SAMUEL H. GLASSMIRE, OIL AND GAS ROYALTIES 50 (2d ed. 1930). Casinghead
gas is wet gas produced along with oil. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 3, at 142.
218. See, e.g., BRYAN, supra note 198, at 416-18; A.E. WILKINSON & J.A. RICHARDSON,
THE LAW OF OIL AND NATURAL GAS 142-47 (1915) (Forms VI and VII).
219. In 1914, there were approximately 1,600,000 cars, 85,000 trucks, and 17,000 farm
tractors in the United States. RUTH S. KNOWLES, THE GREATEST GAMBLERS 156 (1959).
By 1918, there were 5,600,000 cars, 525,000 trucks, and 44,000 farm tractors. Id.
220. 83 So. 232 (La. 1919).
221. Id. at 238.
222. Hammett Oil Co. v. Gypsy Oil Co., 218 P. 501, 504 (Okla. 1923).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 505.
225. Id. at 506.
226. See SUMMERS, supra note 121, § 595.
227. Lest the argument that precedent will bind the courts of any particular jurisdiction
be taken too far, it should be noted that in Texas, the bastion of plain terms interpretation,
the courts held in the casinghead gasoline disputes that the royalty clause required royalty
on casinghead gas from which gasoline was extracted. Reynolds v. McMan Oil & Gas Co.,
11 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1928) (involving a royalty clause identical to that in Hammett Oil);
Livingston Oil Corp. v. Waggoner, 273 S.W. 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1925, writ
ref'd). One commentator has suggested that the result in these cases was designed to
"prevent injustice," and that under a plain terms interpretation the result should have been
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In addition, both Frey and Klein were based in part upon unusual state
statutes that may expand the royalty obligation on an unjust enrichment
theory. The Louisiana statute defines the lessor's royalty to include
"[s]uch interests in production or its value ... whether created by the lease
or by separate instrument, if they comprise a part of the negotiated agree-
ment resulting in execution of the lease. z22 8 The Arkansas statute im-
poses upon the lessee the duty to "protect the royalty of the lessor's
interest by paying to the lessor or his assignees the same price, including
such premiums... and bonuses of whatsoever name for royalty oil or gas
that is paid the ... lessee ... for the working interest." 229 Most states,
including Oklahoma, apparently have no such legislation. Thus, to the
extent that Frey and Klein were based upon statutory language, they may
stand alone.
b. Inherent Limits to the Royalty Obligation
The "but for" reasoning of Frey creates a Palsgrafian2 30 chain of causa-
tion that might make virtually every benefit obtainable to a lessee subject
to royalty. For example, must a lessee pay royalty on its profits from the
sale of a lease to a third party? What if a lessee discovers a well on the
leased property, greatly increasing both the value of its other properties
in the area and the lessee's stock? Is royalty due on the increase in stock
value? If a lessee delivers gas to a fertilizer plant owned by the lessee and
uses the gas as feed stock for fertilizer, is the lessor entitled to the royalty
share of fertilizer profits? In each case, the lessee's profits are derivative
of the rights transferred and would not have existed but for the existence
of the lease.
Frey goes too far. Independently of whether one believes oil and gas
leases are cooperative ventures between lessors and lessees, there are in-
herent limits to the royalty obligation that may affect the lessors' right to
claim royalty on take-or-pay benefits and other payments to lessees. His-
tory and logic suggest that the scope of the royalty obligation should be
different, because "[u]nder the Texas view that an oil and gas lease conveys the oil and gas
in place ... the lessee was privileged to produce the casinghead gas but under no express
duty to pay a royalty therefor." SUMMERS, supra note 121, § 596.
228. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:213(5) (West 1989) (emphasis added) (quoted in Frey,
603 So. 2d at 172).
229. ARx. CODE ANN. § 15-74-705 (Michie 1987). Interestingly, a prior codification of
this statute was dismissed as "inapplicable" after it had been asserted by the lessors to
convert fixed price leases to proceeds leases. Hillard v. Stephens, 637 S.W.2d 581, 586
(Ark. 1982).
230. In Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), the classic case on proxi-
mate causation in torts, railroad employees assisting a passenger aboard a train leaving the
station dislodged a package the passenger was carrying. The package contained fireworks
that exploded and caused scales located on the station platform to tip over and injure Ms.
Palsgraf. On appeal from a trial court's decision in favor of Ms. Palsgraf based upon "but
for" or direct causation analysis, the New York Court of Appeals (in an opinion by Justice
Benjamin Cardozo) reversed the trial court, holding that tort liability for negligence re-
quired both (1) a breach of a duty toward the plaintiff and (2) harm to the plaintiff that is
reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 100-01.
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limited to the fruits of lessees' production functions,231 which typically
occur at or near the wellhead, and should not extend to entrepreneurial
functions such as marketing, transportation or processing.
232
i. History of the Royalty Obligation
Historically, the royalty obligation has excluded entrepreneurship.
Royalty233 has always been due "at the well," 234 where the product from
which the royalty is paid comes into being. In the Middle Ages, the Brit-
ish Crown held title to all land. After enfeoffment of the feudal lords, the
King retained a "royalty" right to take gold or silver that might be found
in the lands he had conveyed.235 When the King alienated the right to
mine, he typically reserved part of all the ore to be delivered "on top of
the ground free of charge," which was also called "royalty."
236
The civil law embodied a concept of royalty similar to that of the com-
mon law. Spanish law recognized the dominio radical, literally the "root
ownership," the King's ownership of minerals contained in the soil of the
231. Though I hesitate to list it as support, my colloquial experience of nearly 25 years
dealing with lessors and lessees also supports the distinction between the production func-
tion and marketing and other enhancements to production. Lessors do not generally ex-
pect to share in the benefits (or the risks) of the lessee's entrepreneurship. They
instinctively think of the lease as a cooperative venture limited to development of the
leased property.
232. Others have also suggested that the courts should distinguish the production func-
tion from value-enhancing functions such as gathering, marketing, and processing in defin-
ing the royalty obligation. See, e.g., Maxwell, supra note 24, § 15.03; R. Pierce, supra note
24, at 8-19 to 8-21. Cf. John S. Lowe, The Meaning of "Payout" in Oil and Gas Farmout
Agreements, 10 E. MIN. L. INST. § 13.01, § 13.05[2], at 13-46 (1989).
233. Royalty comes to the oil and gas industry from the feudal system in England,
SAMUEL H. GLASSMIRE, LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES AND ROYALTIES § 10, at 55-56
(1935), where it was developed to distinguish the share of production reserved by the
Crown from the production rights of those granted the right to work mines and quarries.
HARRIET S. DAoGETI-, MINERAL RiOHTs IN LOUISIANA 247 (1949). "Royalty" was also
used in feudal England in the context of landlord/tenant relations. Feudal lords received
title to land directly from the Crown as a reward for services and on the condition that they
would render future services. Feudal lords in turn permitted their tenants to cultivate the
land in return for a share of the products of the tenants' efforts. Feudal tenants held only a
"working interest" in land, producing crops at their own labor and expense. The share of
the products given to landlords by tenants was also termed "royalty" since it was the por-
tion accruing to the landowners as a result of the royal grant or favor. Taylor v. Peck, 116
N.E.2d 417, 418 (Ohio 1953). See also GLASSMIRE, supra note 217, at 19. The form of a
grant of the right to develop minerals, with a concomitant royalty to the mineral owner,
was adopted over the years for natural resources development generally. The modem U.S.
oil and gas lease evolved from forms used in the manufacture of salt from brine water,
which in turn developed from solid minerals mining leases, and still clearly reflects its ori-
gins. Moses, supra note 198, at 10.
234. Generally, the cases interpret "at the well" to mean "within the lease boundaries."
Skaggs v. Heard, 172 F. Supp. 813, 815 (S.D. Tex. 1959); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613
S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1981).
235. A.J. THUss, JR., TEXAS OIL AND GAS § 117 at 156 (2d ed. 1935). The grant of the
colony of Pennsylvania to William Penn by King Charles II in March of 1681 illustrates the
system of royal patronage in early colonial times. The royal patent reserved "one-fifth of
all the gold and silver discovered in the region." GLASSMIRE, supra note 233, at 56. The
King clearly appreciated the value of a royalty, although he did not anticipate the substan-
tial value that a royalty on coal, oil, and gas would have yielded. Id.
236. THuss, supra note 235, at 156.
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lands of his subjects. 237 The King's right derived from the Mining Ordi-
nance of 1783-itself promulgated by Charles III, the greatest of the
Spanish Bourbons-which listed royal minerals and set forth a procedure
by which subjects could produce them.238 The ordinance authorized a
miner's royalty to the King, the derecho del quinto ("the tax of the fifth
part").239
In the United States, "market value," "amount realized," and "market
price" were used in lease royalty clauses, sometimes interchangeably, to
describe a royalty at the production point, before the lessee applied its
entrepreneurship to enhance value by transporting, processing or market-
ing the gas.240 The fact that leases used before gas processing made sales
at the tailgate common used "market value," "market price at the well,"
and "amount realized at the well" interchangeably suggests that the par-
ties thought that the precise term used was of little importance and that
the lessor and lessee would share proportionately the benefits of the sale
of production in the area of the lease.
ii. The Logic of the Cases
Courts have frequently recognized that a lessee is entitled to en-
trepreneurial uses of production without sharing benefits. In Wilkins v.
Nelson,241 the Louisiana Supreme Court denied a royalty owner's claim
to a share of gasoline revenues where gasoline was extracted from a well
producing only gas and the lease provided for a flat rental for gas. The
court did not mention unjust enrichment. 242 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Record243 and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ochsner,244 the Fifth Circuit held
that royalty under a "market value at the well" royalty clause was due
based on the value of the gas at the well for use in the manufacture of
gasoline. This was despite the fact that the lessee actually exchanged the
gas produced with another who used the gas to generate heat and light,
237. "[N]o mention of minerals needed to be made in title papers granting or patenting
land.... Land grants simply had nothing to do with minerals and did not affect their
ownership." WALACE HAWKINS, EL SAL DEL REY 9 (1947).
238. Id. at 7-9.
239. Id. at 9. The ordinance also entitled a surface owner to damages for use of the
surface by a miner. Id.
240. See, e.g., CURTIS M. OAKES, BENOrr's OIL AND GAS FORMS 7 (2d ed. 1939) ("To
pay lessor ... the equal one-eighth (1/8) of the gross proceeds at the prevailing market
rate"), quoting Producers' 88 Standard Lease Form; GLASSMIRE, supra note 217, at 28
("one-eighth of the gross proceeds of the gas at the prevailing market rate"); RICHARD L.
BENOIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF OIL AND GAS FORMS 171 (1926) ("one-eighth of the net pro-
ceeds, based on the market or selling price at the well"). See also Wall v. United Gas Pub.
Serv. Co., 152 So. 561, 562 (La. 1934) ("one-eighth (1/8) of the value of such gas calculated
at the market price per thousand feet"); George Siefkin, Rights of Lessor and Lessee with
Respect to Sale of Gas and as to Gas Royalty Provisions, 4 INST. OF OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N
181, 214 (1953) ("the equal one-eighth (1/8) of the gross proceeds at the prevailing market
rate, for gas used off the premises") (emphasis in original), discussing the royalty clause in
a typical Kansas lease.
241. 99 So. 607 (La. 1924).
242. Id. at 609.
243. 146 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1944).
244. 146 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1944).
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uses that commanded a higher price but which had no established market
at the well.245 The court noted:
Lessee did not sell the gas. It simply traded it for an equal quantity
of the same kind and of the same market value in another part of the
field for use in its gasoline plant there. It received the gas as owner
under its lease, and it was obligated to pay appellee the market value
at the well, no more and no less, and this without regard to the use
made of it.246
In Sowell v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 47 the court held that
gas royalties based on the average market price being paid for gas in a
six-county area were paid for all of the constituents of that gas, including
gas liquids collected in "drip pots" between the wellhead, the metering
station and the processing plant. The court reasoned that, because pro-
duction triggers the obligation to pay royalty, the rights and obligations of
the parties should be assessed at the wellhead.248 After the industry re-
structuring of the 1980s, in Carter v. Exxon Corp.,249 a Texas court of
appeals held that a lease calling for royalty based upon "market value at
the well" did not permit the royalty owner to share in revenues generated
by the lessee in manufacturing liquid products downstream from the well
because "at the well" requires royalty to be determined on "gas that is
produced in its natural state, not on the components of the gas that are
later extracted. '2
50
Substantial indirect case law also supports excluding entrepreneurial
functions from the royalty obligation. Implied covenant cases, for exam-
ple, have recognized that while the lessee's implied covenants may re-
quire the installation of a booster on the lease to force gas into a
pipeline251 or construction of a plant to permit carbon dioxide produc-
tion,2 52 there is no implied obligation to construct a pipeline to permit gas
to be marketed.2 53 The lessee has a duty to act on or near the lease to
make production possible to take advantage of a market but has no duty
to act away from the lease to create a market. 254
245. Id. at 139-40.
246. Id. at 141 (citing Gulf Prod. Co. v. Taylor, 28 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1930, writ dism'd); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Stine, 41 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1931, judgm't adopted); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Poe, 29 S.W.2d 1019 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1930, judgm't adopted).
247. 789 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1986).
248. Id. at 1157-58.
249. 842 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, writ denied). See supra notes 140-43
and accompanying text for further discussion of Carter.
250. Carter, 842 S.W. 2d at 397 (relying on Sowell v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am.,
789 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1986)).
251. Swamp Branch Oil & Gas Co. v. Rice, 70 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1934).
252. See, e.g., Libby v. De Baca, 179 P.2d 263 (N.M. 1947) (upholding a lease cancella-
tion for breach of the covenant to reasonably develop where the lessee had discovered
carbon dioxide on a 23,000-acre lease but failed to construct a dry ice plant needed to
produce and market the gas).
253. See, e.g., Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. Staats, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 571 (D. Kan. 1967);
Fey v. A.A. Oil Corp., 285 P.2d 578 (Mont. 1955).




More directly relevant to the distinction between the lessee's produc-
tion function and entrepreneurial activities are the cases recognizing that
royalty is due at the well, rather than downstream, even when the lease
does not stipulate that the calculation is "at the well. '255 Wall v. United
Gas Public Service Co.2 56 is the classic case. In Wall the relevant lease
royalty clause provided that when gas was sold or used off the premises,
"the grantor shall be paid one-eighth (1/8) of the value of such gas calcu-
lated at the market price. '257 Gas from the well was transported about
two miles and sold, along with gasoline extracted from the gas stream, for
5.8 cents per MCF.258 The lessees paid royalty based upon the market
price of the gas at the well, approximately four cents per MCF.259 The
lessors sued, contending that royalty should be based upon the price for
which the gas was sold off the lease after transportation. 260 The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court ruled in favor of the lessee, reasoning that "the par-
ties intended that, if there was a market for gas in the field, the current
market price there should be paid. There is where the gas was reduced to
possession and there is where ownership of it sprang into existence."'261
Thus, the scope of the cooperative venture is limited; the oil and gas lease
is a venture to develop a producing well, and the wellhead is "where the
parties come into ownership of the commodity. ' 262 The cooperative ven-
ture theory ought not extend to downstream entrepreneurial functions of
the lessee.
Finally, the rationale of the cases that recognize that royalty is subject
to post-production costs also indirectly supports a royalty obligation that
excludes entrepreneurship. It is axiomatic that the working interest must
bear all of the costs of producing oil or gas; royalty is free of costs in-
curred "at the well" because those costs are required to create the pro-
duction from which the royalty share comes. It is equally clear, however,
that where royalty is valued at the well by working back from down-
stream sales,263 costs incurred by the working interest to move or im-
255. See Siefkin, supra note 240, at 191-203.
256. 152 So. 561 (La. 1934).
257. Id. at 562.
258. Id.
259. Id
260. Id at 563.
261. Wall, 152 So. at 563.
262. Id. See Sartor v. United Carbon Co., 163 So. 103, 104-05 (La. 1935). See also Sow-
ell v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 789 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1986); Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Record, 146 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1944); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ochsner, 146 F.2d
138 (5th Cir. 1944); and Danciger Oil & Ref., Inc. v. Hamill Drilling Co., 141 Tex. 153, 171
S.W.2d 321 (1943). Cf Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Price, 364 S.W. 260 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1963, no writ).
263. Royalty is valued at the well by working back from a sale price only if better data
establishing value is not available. The courts take a pragmatic approach: "Market value is
a question of fact .... [T]he point is to determine the price a reasonable buyer would have
paid ... at the well when produced." Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 238-39. See also Montana
Ry. Co. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348 (1890). Sales at the wellhead at the time of production are
the best evidence of value. In the absence of the producer's breach of the implied cove-
nant to market or the existence of circumstances that distort the economics of the transac-
tion, such as commitment to a long-term fixed-price contract, an actual arms-length sale at
19961
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prove the product must be deducted from the downstream sales price,
264
whether the royalty clause calls for royalty based upon "market value" or
"proceeds. 2 65 The value of any commodity depends upon its proximity
to market, and the value of oil or gas normally increases as it moves
closer to the bumertip. Thus, post-production costs tend to increase the
value of the product and must be deducted from the downstream sales
the wellhead establishes market value. Cabot Corp. v. Brown, 754 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex.
1987). Sales similar in time, quantity, quality, and availability to market are the favored
proof of value where there are no sales at the wellhead. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co., 554 F.2d 381, 387 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977); accord
Ochsner, 146 F.2d at 141. "The absence of an available market does not mean that the
[product] lacks value, however." Scott Paper Co. v. Taslog, Inc., 638 F.2d 790, 799 (5th Cir.
1981). The courts use a work-back method of royalty valuation, by which value at the
wellhead is established by deducting costs incurred by the working interest from the down-
stream sales price to work back to value at the wellhead, where there are no comparable
sales in the area of the well:
Effective application of this [work-back] method requires selection of an ap-
propriate starting value in the form of a processing stage whose product pos-
sesses a value certain; accurate assessment of the costs accruing between the
known stage and the one in question is also essential. In developing a re-
source from a raw material into a finished product, each production stage
will add economic value to what was initially only the value of the raw mate-
rial. The value added at each stage of production is essentially the cost of
resources used in taking the material through that stage of production. The
work-back method essentially establishes at each production stage the value
of the product at that point. By subtracting out all production costs, the
value of the raw material is revealed.
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 463 F. Supp. 619, 620 (N.D. Okla. 1978), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 607 F.2d 335 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980). "A
starting place for the work-back method can be any point in the production-processing-sale
chain where a dollar figure can be established by reliable evidence .... Ashland Oil Co.,
607 F.2d at 336. The work-back valuation method " 'is the least desirable method of deter-
mining market price.'" Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 239 (quoting Montana Power Co. v.
Kravik, 586 P.2d 298, 303-04 (Mont. 1978)); See also Ashland Oil, 554 F.2d at 387.
The hierarchy of royalty valuation methods is intuitive. Market value is what a willing
buyer and willing seller would agree upon under the circumstances. Ashland Oil, 463 F.
Supp. at 626; State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 979 (1936); Exxon Corp. v. Jeffer-
son Land Co., 573 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Where gas is actually sold at the wellhead in a transaction negotiated at the time of sale, all
elements of the definition and the transaction are in congruity unless the sale is not at arms
length or the parties act unreasonably; thus, an actual sale at the wellhead is the best evi-
dence of value.
Comparable sales illustrate an available market and are strong evidence of value where
there are no actual sales. The circumstances of comparable sales, however, will never be
completely the same as the circumstances at the wellhead. Ashland Oil, 554 F.2d at 386
(rejecting a determination of value based on data covering "a broad time span and a wide
geographical distribution, [because] [t]he transactions ...were too remote in time or
place.").
The work-back method is the hardest valuation method to use accurately because it
begins furthest from the wellhead. There are likely to be more variables to consider,
although the work-back method "can be just as accurate as any other method ...." Id. at
387; see also Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 240.
264. Post-production costs typically include transportation, compression, and process-
ing, as well as certain severance and gross production taxes. See 3 EUGENE 0. KUNTZ, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 40.5 (1995); 3 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS &
CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 645-645.3 (Supp. 1994). See also Sternberger
v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995).
265. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 241.
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price to obtain an accurate valuation "at the well." 266 It should follow
that no royalty is due on revenues generated by a lessee's downstream or
entrepreneurial activities.
267
The historical and logical distinction between the lessee's production
and entrepreneurial functions suggests an additional reason why even
courts that view the lease as a cooperative venture may refuse to extend
the royalty obligation to include take-or-pay benefits. If the scope of the
cooperative venture is limited to production and marketing in the area of
the lease, as history and logic indicate, take-or-pay benefits may then be
seen as part of the entrepreneurship of the lessee, compensation to the
lessee for committing gas to a particular buyer.268 This reasoning is not
conclusive, however, because the take-or-pay clause may also be viewed
as part of the benefits provided by the market available in the field for
the gas that the lessee committed to contract at the time of the contract,
and thus a benefit derived from the lessee's production function.
269
266. Id.
[I]n the analytical process of reconstructing a market value where none
otherwise exists with sufficient definiteness, all increase in the ultimate sales
value attributable to the expenses incurred in transporting and processing the
commodity must be deducted. The royalty owner shares only in what is left
over, whether stated in terms of cash or an end product.
Freeland v. Sun Oil Co., 277 F.2d 154, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 826 (1960). See
also Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 240; Piney Woods, 539 F. Supp. at 971.
The same reasoning is sometimes stated in equitable terms. Because oil or gas increases
in value as it nears the burnertip, calculating royalty on the downstream sales price without
deducting the costs incurred in moving the product and improving its quality would un-
justly enrich the royalty owner, whose royalty is due at the well, at the working interest
owner's expense. Freeland, 277 F.2d at 159; See also Piney Woods, 539 F. Supp. at 971;
Coyle v. Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co., 144 So. 737 (La. 1932); Miller v. Buck Creek Oil Co.,
269 P. 43 (Wyo. 1928).
267. Indeed, in Frey, the Louisiana Supreme Court implicitly recognized limits to its
cooperative venture theory that parallel the distinction that I urge between lease develop-
ment and entrepreneurship:
In light of Henry, we conclude an oil and gas lease, and the royalty clause
therein, is rendered meaningless where the lessee receives a higher percent-
age of the gross revenues generated by the leased property than contem-
plated by the lease. The lease represents a bargained-for exchange, with the
benefits flowing directly from the leased premises to the lessee and the les-
sor, the latter via royalty. An economic benefit accruing from the leased
land, generated solely by virtue of the lease, and which is not expressly ne-
gated, is to be shared between the lessor and lessee in the fractional division
contemplated by the lease.
Frey, 603 So. 2d at 174 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). By this analysis, the court
could just as easily have found that revenues generated by take-or-pay payments, buy-
downs, or" buy-outs were incidental to the lease because they flowed primarily from the
entrepreneurship of the lessee.
268. There is some indirect historical support for this conclusion. We know that take-
or-pay clauses have been present in gas contracts for many years. See Ben R. Howell, Gas
Purchase Contracts, 4 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 151, 168-74 (1953). We know, as
well, that take-or-pay payments have been made previously. I have found no cases prior to
those discussed in this Article, however, in which royalty owners have sought royalty on
such payments.
269. In fact, in the 1970s and 1980s, pipeline companies used high take-or-pay commit-
ments as substitutes for price competition, which was barred by the federal gas regulatory
scheme. John S. Lowe, Gas Contracting: The Lessons of the Seventies, 3 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T 3, 5 (1989).
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In sum, while the cooperative venture theory is likely to gain wide ac-
ceptance, in fact if not name, whether or not a court adopts that theory
should not determine whether royalty is due on take-or-pay benefits. The
cases that have proceeded from recognition of the cooperative venture
theory to liability for royalty on take-or-pay benefits may be distin-
guished by their reliance upon equitable principles and special statutes.
Further, if the lease is a cooperative venture between lessor and lessee,
history and logic dictate that the venture is limited to lease development
and does not extend to entrepreneurial activities. The real issue is how to
characterize take-or-pay benefits, and the problem is that they may fairly
be categorized either as within the scope of the cooperative venture or as
the fruits of the lessee's entrepreneurship.
V. ROYALTY ON OTHER BENEFITS IN THE
RESTRUCTURED MARKET
As is noted above, deregulation of the gas industry spawned a variety
of sophisticated financial devices that producers and purchasers use to
hedge their risks and increase their profits.270 The revenues that produ-
cers receive from such devices will certainly become the subject of royalty
claims. The royalty obligation principles discussed above relating to roy-
alty on take-or-pay benefits may help solve this next wave of royalty
disputes.
A. "PLAIN TERMS" JURISDICTIONS
In jurisdictions wedded to the concept of a royalty obligation that is
tied to the "plain terms" of the royalty clause, pre-production en-
trepreneurial activities of the lessee271 ought not be subject to royalty
because there is no "production" or "sale" of production at the time of
the transaction. Monsanto Co. v. Tyrrell,272 where plain terms analysis
resulted in the holding that a recoupable advance payment made by a gas
purchaser to a lessee for future production was not a "recovery from pro-
duction" that triggered a provision for additional royalty, seems to herald
Texas' approach to such issues.
On the other hand, current demand charges or production-based bo-
nuses are certainly tied to production.273 Such payments may not be
treated as "amounts realized" subject to royalty, however, if a court dis-
tinguishes between the production function and entrepreneurial activities
of the lessee in defining the royalty obligation. A demand charge or a
production-based bonus for deliveries is not payment for lease produc-
270. See supra notes 15-30 and accompanying text.,
271. Pre-production entrepreneurial activities include transactions such as the sale of
production in place, gas inventory charges, reservation fees, hedges, and forward trades.
272. 537 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




tion, but rather reflects the value of the lessee's commitment or
performance. 274
B. COOPERATIVE VENTURE JURISDICTIONS
In jurisdictions that view the lease as a cooperative venture, the analy-
sis of this Article suggests that the Louisiana Supreme Court certainly
went too far when it suggested in Frey that royalty is due on the "whole
... of the economic benefits obtained ... in the exercise of the rights
granted by the ... Lease. '2 75 The court's language has raised concern
that even indirect benefits of take-or-pay settlements, buy-outs and buy-
downs, such as access to transportation or favorable transportation rates,
might be considered an "amount realized" from the sale of gas under the
cooperative venture theory.
If one also accepts that history and logic limit the royalty obligation to
lease development functions, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court's
statement exceeded its reasoning. In cooperative venture theory states,
the outcome of disputes over whether benefits received by a producer are
part of the "amount realized" within the meaning of the royalty clause
should turn upon the nexus between the production function that consti-
tutes the cooperative venture and the payment. If the payment in ques-
tion is proximately related to lease development, then royalty will be due.
On the other hand, if the payment is "entrepreneurship compensation," a
payment generated by the deal-making abilities of the producer rather
than by the intrinsic value of the oil and gas that comes out of the well,
royalty will not be due.
This analysis suggests that courts in jurisdictions that adopt the cooper-
ative venture theory will likely reject royalty claims on prepurchases, pro-
duction payments, gas inventory charges, reservation fees, hedges, swaps,
274. This analysis may be unpersuasive where the demand charge and commodity
charge are contained in the same contract clause. For example, consider the following gas
contract provision:
The price for gas shall be a two-part charge composed of a reservation charge
and a commodity charge calculated as follows:
(a) The reservation charge shall be - per MMBTU and for monthly
billing purposes shall be multiplied times the MDQ, the production of which
is then multiplied times the number of days in the month.
(b) The commodity charge shall be determined on a monthly basis and
shall be an amount equal to the index price for spot gas delivered in - as
reported in the - publication of - plus (or minus) - per
MMBTU. For monthly billing purposes the commodity charge shall be mul-
tiplied times the quantity of gas nominated for the month.
(c) Buyer shall be responsible for paying the amounts billed each month
pursuant to the pricing formula in accordance with section - hereof.
4 W.L. SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 762 n.35 (John S. Lowe Supp. 1995).
Though the reservation charge and the commodity charge are conceptually different, the
two are added together to make "price" under the contract, which may lead a court to
subject both charges to royalty. Like take-or-pay payments, however, the reservation
charge pays for the producer's agreement to supply gas, not for gas produced. Moreover,
gas contracts that contain such two-part charges typically do not commit or dedicate spe-
cific leases to their performance.
275. Frey, 603 So. 2d at 180.
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collars and other exotic financial transactions of lessees involving gas sup-
plies in the deregulated market. Such payments reflect the lessee's busi-
ness expertise rather than the value of the product created by the
cooperative venture of the lease. Likewise, producers should not gener-
ally be subject to royalty on resales by affiliates which have bought gas in
the lease area or at a market hub, so long as the sale from the producer to
the affiliate was made at a fair price.276
Finally, the common practice of pooling royalty, paying royalty on the
weighted average sales price for the royalty pool, ought not be necessary,
except in cases where transportation to the sales hub is subject to con-
strictions that inflate transportation costs or where an inefficient hub
market artificially deflates the spot market price. Where the market is
not at the well, the lessee has no implied obligation to create one. Where
an entrepreneurial lessee creates a market, the lessor's royalty need not
reflect the marginal benefits of the lessee's entrepreneurial activity. In-
stead, a royalty based upon the hub index price, adjusted back to value or
amount received at the well, should suffice.277
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether the scope of the royalty obligation extends to royalty on take-
or-pay benefits and other attributes of the new gas markets is likely to be
determined in part by whether the courts view the royalty clause as a
plain terms statement of the agreement of the lessor and lessee or as an
inherently ambiguous provision of a cooperative venture that requires
they look behind the words of the clause to market realities and the par-
ties' relationship. Jurisdictions applying a "plain terms" analysis defined
the royalty obligation broadly in the market value royalty disputes but
appear likely to adopt a narrow definition in litigation over take-or-pay
benefits and new market revenues. Jurisdictions that view the lease as a
cooperative venture, however, defined the royalty obligation narrowly in
the market value disputes but may extend the obligation to take-or-pay
benefits and receipts generated by the market.
But the analysis ought not be that simple. Appealing, though probably
ultimately ineffectual, arguments exist that take-or-pay benefits should be
subject to royalty as "amounts realized" even in plain terms jurisdictions.
Even stronger arguments suggest that, if the oil and gas lease is a cooper-
ative venture, it is nonetheless limited by history and logic to the produc-
tion function, so that entrepreneurial activities and the revenues they
generate-which may include take-or-pay benefits-are beyond the
scope of the royalty obligation.
276. "Sham" sales, of course, would trigger liability for breach of the implied covenants.
One pair of commentators has suggested that transactions between producers and market-
ing affiliates are likely to be scrutinized harshly by the courts. WRIGHT & SHARPE, supra
note 24, at 249-50.
277. See supra notes 140-43 (discussing Carter v. Exxon Corp., 842 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1992, writ denied)).
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Whichever approach a court may choose, jurists have ample "wiggle-
room." The case and statutory law in Oklahoma, for example, is different
enough from that of Louisiana and Arkansas to justify the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's refusal to order royalty on take-or-pay benefits. The
royalty on take-or-pay benefits cases, as well as the claims for royalty on
some of the "unbundled" payments of the deregulated gas industry, are
close calls, and we are likely to see them decided inconsistently as a result
of legitimate but diverse analyses and differing convictions of fairness.

